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The European Policy Unit
The European Policy Unit at the European University Institute was created to 
further three main goals. First, to continue the development of the European 
University Institute as a forum for critical discussion of key items on the Community 
agenda. Second, to enhance the documentation available to scholars of European 
affairs. Third, to sponsor individual research projects on topics of current interest 
to the European Communities. Both as in-depth background studies and as policy 
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The role of the European Parliament in the environmental policy of the European 
Community (EC), and more specifically the question what impact the European 
Parliament had on policy-making in this field has been studied before. The 
observers’ judgements ranged between outrightly affirming Parliament’s positive 
influence in promoting the Community’s policy on the environment on the one 
hand, and considering its limits on the other.
Griindling (1989), for instance, ascribes to Parliament the function of a motor 
for environmental policy. Prima facie, this assessment seems justified in view of the 
impressive number of environment-related reports, resolutions and written and oral 
questions addressed to the Commission and the Council of Ministers. The 
environmental and the social dimensions of European integration are certainly given 
particular attention by the House (Schmuck 1990: 69). Other authors, while not 
questioning the assembly’s political will and efforts, nevertheless point to the legal 
constraints under which Parliament operates. Moreover, the obvious disregard of 
its proposals by the Commission and the Council is stressed. Thus, Hannequart 
(1979) mentions the early initiatives of Parliament in the field of the environment. 
He points to the involvement of the European Parliament in deciding on the 
general orientation of Community environmental policy, in giving its opinion on 
individual pieces of legislation and in using written and oral questions as 
instruments of expression and control. However, its actual influence was limited due 
to the non-binding nature of its opinions.
At the end of the 1970s, it was nevertheless expected that the legitimacy which 
Parliament would gain through its being directly elected since 1979 would make it 
more difficult for the Commission and the Council to disregard its will. Another 
step forward was certainly made by the Single European Act in 1987 which 
increased the leverage of the European Parliament also in certain environmental 
matters. The new cooperation procedure entails more participation rights for 




























































































market. Yet, the Council’s frequent disregard of what Parliament says led Member 
of Parliament (MEP) François Roelants du Vivier to talk of a refusal of democracy 
even after the Single Act (Roelants du Vivier 1988: 37).
Parliament itself obviously tries to present itself as the spokesman for 
environmental concerns. In brochures on the occasion of the European 
Environment Year 1987, it claimed to be a driving force for environmental 
protection in Europe (Europàisches Parlament 1987a, 1987b). Ken Collins, at 
present the chairman of Parliament’s environment committee, asserts that the 
European Parliament is by no means "a toothless institution" (Collins 1990: 276). 
More detailed studies of Parliament’s secretariat convey a differentiated picture of 
both failures and successes (cf. European Parliament 1984, 1987, 1988a, 1988b). In 
sum, the existing documentation and literature draw a picture of some notable 
successes, piecemeal influence and many cases of manifest contempt of Parliament’s 
opinions and initiatives by the Commission and the Council.
The purpose of this paper is to add some empirical findings to the existing body 
of work (Part A). Furthermore, the subject is approached from a new angle insofar 
as Parliament’s internal workings related to environmental policy is concerned (Part 
B). As the question of institutional reform with a view to the creation of a 
European Union is on the agenda, it may be worthwhile to draw up a balance sheet 
of Parliament’s past performance and to look at problems which the House 
experiences in contributing to the development of EC environmental policy. Such 
an analysis may help in answering the question if an extension of Parliament’s 




























































































Part A - The role of the European Parliament within 
the institutional system of the European Community
Every political system has its own definition of roles and powers and their 
distribution between the different institutions. Indeed, these definitions are a 
fundamental part of each national constitution. In the case of the EC, it is the 
Treaties setting up the European Community that fulfil the same function. Besides 
the Treaty base, however, certain mechanisms and procedures have developed over 
time which influence the workings of the Community system. An assessment of the 
role that the European Parliament plays in Community politics can therefore rely 
not solely on a reading of the relevant legal provisions but must also look at other 
channels through which Parliament gets involved in the political process.
Beyond the institutional particularities of each political system, several main 
functions can be identified which are assumed by parliaments in the polities of 
Western European countries. According to Klaus von Beyme (1975; quoted in 
European Parliament 1989a: 13f), the following six principal functions of 
parliaments can be distinguished:
- The representation and articulation function;
- the communication function;
- the controlling function;
- the function of participation in the appointment and dismissal of the executive;
- the legislative function;
- the recruiting function.
An analysis of the European Parliament’s role in the political process can be 
usefully structured according to a functionalist approach along von Beyme’s 
conceptualization. A closer look, however, reveals that not all functions listed above 
fully apply to the European Parliament. Firstly, while the European Parliament can 
dismiss the Commission (Art. 144 EEC), it does not elect it. Rather, the 
Commission is appointed by the member states’ governments. Besides, the Council 




























































































related to the first point, Parliament’s function as a pool for recruiting political 
leaders is limited. While there are individual cases in which Commissioners, 
members of the Council and high-ranking EC officials gained experience in 
Community politics in the European Parliament, the decisive steps in an "EC 
career" are on the national level. The partial non-applicability of the 
appointment/dismissal and the recruiting functions to the European Parliament 
highlights the specific position of this assembly as compared to its national 
counterparts.
Leaving aside also the role of Parliament as a communication link between 
government and the public, which is of less interest when considering the policy­
making process, I will in the following analyse the role of Parliament according to 
the three remaining functions: the representation and articulation function, the 
controlling function and the legislative function. In view of the nature of the 
European Community as "a state in the making", another function must be added, 
and that is the role that Parliament plays in enlarging the scope of Community 
responsibility and forming its institutional framework. While the legislative function 
will be discussed in some depth, the study of the other three functions will be more 
cursory.
1. The European Parliament articulating environmental concerns
According to opinion polls, the deterioration of our natural environment has 
become one of the main causes of concern in Western Europe. In 1986, 72 per cent 
of Community citizens perceived environmental protection as an urgent problem. 
Many were unsatisfied with the effectiveness of action taken by public authorities 
in this field (Europaisches Parlament 1987a: 11-15). Putting these concerns on the 
political agenda is all the more an important task for the European Parliament as 
according to the Eurobarometer opinion poll conducted in the spring of 1989 there 
is strong support for the Community member states laying down common rules for 
the protection of the environment (Eurobarometer No. 31, June 1989, p. 25). On 




























































































Parliament is not wholly positive. Only two out of three respondents felt that 
Parliament is important or very important in EC politics in general, and this 
number declines the more knowledgeable people are about Parliament 
(Eurobarometer No. 31, June 1989, pp. 49f).
One main, albeit indirect way in which the European Parliament can articulate 
the concerns of European citizens is to submit questions to the Commission and the 
Council which will be answered in written or oral form. Art. 140 EEC provides for 
questions to the Commission. Parliament’s Rules of Procedure also provide for the 
possibility of questions to the Council and the Foreign Ministers meeting in 
European Political Cooperation.1 The number of questions asked has increased 
strongly over time (Grabitz et al. 1988: 448-451).
Obviously, questions to the Commission and the Council can pursue very 
different purposes. One intention, which will be dealt with in the next section, is to 
check how the other two Community organs responded to Parliament’s initiatives 
and legislative opinions. Another category of questions solicit information on topical 
issues of general interest, or specific policy matters in Community affairs. Thirdly, 
and relevant to the present context, questions may be motivated by discussions and 
concerns in individual MEPs’ constituencies. The local press may pick up a topic, 
or citizens may approach their MEP on some issue. The MEP is then called on to 
respond to these initiatives. Conversely, the Member himself may take up a matter 
which potentially appeals to his electorate. Asking a question in the European 
Parliament can thus be one way for an MEP to get involved in the interest of his 
or her constituency.
Take the following question as a particularly clear example.2 In 1984, the Dutch 
Socialist Hemmo Muntingh and the German Socialist Klaus Hansch joined forces 
to ask the Commission about increasing damage to forests in the border region of 
Viersen in the German "Land" of Northrhine-Westfalia. This damage was allegedly 
caused mainly by emissions from a power station on the Dutch side of the border.
1 See Rules of Procedure (5th edition), Rules 58 - 62.




























































































The two MEPs requested additional information on the extent of air pollution in 
the area. Moreover, the Commission was asked what it "can and will (...) do to 
safeguard the interests of the population in the border region", and if it sees a 
possibility to intervene with a view to reducing emissions in this particular case. 
These latter two questions clearly reflect concerns among the people in the Viersen 
area. It should be noted that MEP Klaus Hànsch is from Düsseldorf only some 25 
km away from Viersen. MEP Muntingh lives far away from the Viersen area but 
is actively involved in environmental matters in general.
While it is not possible here to provide an assessment of the extent to which 
questions are asked by Members of the European Parliament with a view to 
articulating environmental concerns, at least some numbers on environment-related 
questions in general can be given. Take the written questions of MEPs to the 
Commission on environmental issues3 which are published in the EC’s Official 
Journals from January to April 1988. Those about 150 questions represent 
approximately a tenth out of the total of 1464 questions. This is a considerable 
proportion which can serve as a first indication of the importance attributed to 
environmental matters by the European Parliament. A second observation regards 
the distribution of the 150 questions amongst different MEPs. The questions have 
been asked by 55 Members. Their distribution amongst those MEPs, however, is all 
but equal. 43 questions were asked by François Roelants du Vivier, a Green MEP 
from Belgium, alone. Another 36 questions were asked by three other MEPs, two 
more Green MEPs from Belgium and the abovementioned Dutch Socialist 
Muntingh. Many other MEPs asked between one and four questions. Astonishingly, 
members of the environment committee are not strongly represented among those 
who posed questions. Indeed, only two out of the "top four" questioners are 
members of the environment committee. The observation of a broad range of 
questioners can tentatively be taken as an indication that many of the questions
3
For the purpose of this analysis, environmental policy has been defined as excluding the fields 




























































































asked are posed not on the basis of the political specialization of the questioner but 
in response to external suggestions, for instance concerns in his or her constituency.
Some examples taken from one Offical Journal4 reflect the wide variety of 
problems referred to in parliamentary questions: the creation of a Community 
inspectorate for the environment, the processing of waste into agricultural fertilizers, 
the limitation of emissions from large combustion plants, the transport of dangerous 
substances on internal waterways, the ecological implications of the Greater Carajas 
Programme in Brazil and the slaughter of migrant birds were all taken up by MEPs.
A second means of putting environmental concerns onto the political agenda are 
Parliament’s own-initiative reports and resolutions. Parliament has the right to pick 
up problems it considers important, to prepare reports on them and to pass 
resolutions outside the legislative process.5 These reports are sometimes substantial 
studies of the issue involved. Between June 1984 and April 1989, Parliament 
adopted 55 own-initiative reports in the field of the environment (Kraus 1989). A 
recent publication by Parliament’s secretariat covering the time period between 
1984 and the beginning of 1988 documented 11 reports concerning the protection 
of wild fauna and flora alone (European Parliament 1989b). Eight of these reports 
had been written by MEP Muntingh.
Own-initiative resolutions in general urge the European Community for action 
in some field and make respective proposals. An often-quoted example of where a 
Parliament initiative did instigate Community action is the ban on the import of 
skins from certain baby seals and derived products. Following an initiative by 
Parliament, and against the background of public pressure, a Council directive was 
passed in February 1983, and later extended (European Parliament 1984: 36f; 
1989c: III/N/6). In some of its resolutions, the European Parliament explicitly 
refers to growing public awareness of environmental matters.6 Recent own-initiative
4 OJ No C 112, 28.4.88.
5 See Rules of Procedure (5th edition), Rules 63,64, 118, 121.
6 See, e.g., Parliament’s resolutions of 18.2.86 on the European Environment Year 1987 (OJ No 
C 68,24.3.86, p. 49) and of 10.3.88 on the implementation of European Community legislation relating 




























































































reports include four reports on environmental problems in tropical forests, in 
particular in the Amazon region and relating to Community financed projects 
there7, a report on the environment in urban areas8, two reports on the protection 
of brown bears and wolves respectively9, a report on the consequences of a rapid 
rise in the sea level10, and a report on tourism and the environment11.
As far as the effect of own-initiative resolutions on Community policy is 
concerned, no comprehensive data are available. Pursuant to an agreement with 
Parliament in 1983, the Commission regularly publishes "Reports on Action taken 
by the Commission in Response to Parliament’s Own-initiative Resolutions".12 The 
picture that emerges from the chapter on the environment and civil protection of 
the 1989 annual report is that the Commission did take action on the problems 
taken up in Parliament’s resolutions. To what extent these actions correspond to 
Parliament’s wishes remains unclear, however. Besides, the Commission may have 
become active regardless of Parliament’s resolution. Finally, comparable follow-up 
reports by the Council do not exist.
In sum, the European Parliament sees itself as the spokesman for the 
environment-related concerns of European citizens. It clearly makes an effort to put 
these concerns on the agenda by asking questions to the Commission and the 
Council, by looking into environmental problems in its own-initiative reports and 
by urging the EC for action by means of its own-initiative resolutions. This 
articulation function is a crucial element in Parliament’s role in EC environmental 
policy.
7 Doc A 2-124/89,27.4.89; Doc A  3-181/90 and Doc A3-182/90, 5.7.90; Doc A3-231/90, 26.9.90 
(by the Committee on Development and Cooperation).
8 Doc A2-294/88, 5.12.88.
9 Doc A2-339/88, 6.1.89; Doc A2-377/88, 31.1.89.
10 Doc A2-87/89, 19.4.89.
11 Doc A3-120/90, 6.6.90.




























































































2. The European Parliament controlling the Commission and the Council of 
Ministers
A second important function of parliaments in Western democracies is the political 
control of the executive. In the case of the European Community, this control has 
to be exercised both over the Commission and the Council of Ministers. Moreover, 
as Community law is implemented mainly by the member states, Parliament’s work 
extends also to the national level.
One instrument by which Parliament fulfils its control function has been dealt 
with in a different context already in the last section. Questions by MEPs to the 
Commission and the Council do not only serve the articulation of environmental 
concerns. They can also serve to check the action (or non-action) of these two 
organs on individual environment-related problems. By asking a question, an MEP 
can press the Commission and the Council to take a position on the subject raised. 
Even if at least the Council is not even obliged by the Treaties to reply to MEPs’ 
questions, and even if an answer given is evasive or little informative, as is often the 
case, a question can signal parliamentary awareness and serve as the starting point 
for further parliamentary involvement. Posing questions thus is an indirect 
instrument of control. Besides, as the implementation of EC environmental law by 
national authorities is often wanting, questions may point to failures in this regard. 
Indeed, "parliamentary questions are more and more often used by the European 
Parliament as an indirect means to initiate proceedings for a Member State’s failure 
to comply with its obligations." (JUSletter Bulletin 6/89: 30)
Consider, for example, the written question No 2245/87 by MEP Muntingh.13 
This question followed the publication in the French official journal of a 
supplement to the list of birds which are allowed to be hunted. However, eight of 
the birds included were protected by the Community’s Wild Birds Directive. As the 
Member pointed out, France had recently been condemned for not complying with 
this directive by the EC Court of Justice. This new violation showed again the




























































































French "intention of continuing to disregard that directive." The Commission was 
therefore asked what it planned to do in order to prevent the hunting of the bird 
species concerned. In a suggestive way the Commission was also asked if it would 
"use its contacts with hunters’ organizations to urge the latter to play a more active 
part in combatting practices that come into conflict with the EEC Wild Birds 
Directive." The reply to the question by Commissioner Clinton Davis showed that 
the Commission was still in the process of considering the steps to be taken in this 
matter. The Commission’s probe apparently was not initiated by MEP Muntingh’s 
question, however. If a particular question has a political impact or not is obviously 
open. Nevertheless, at least potentially, parliamentary questions are a powerful 
instrument of instigating the enforcement of Community law.
The incorporation of EC directives into national law, and even more so their 
actual implementation by national authorities and their efficacy are crucial 
problems in Community environmental policy. In the last few years, awareness 
within the Community institutions about these problems has increased, and the 
implementation gap has become a political issue in itself. Besides with using its 
right to ask questions, the European Parliament has become active in this field in 
several ways.
Firstly, many directives in the field of environmental regulation contain explicit 
provisions for the control of their implementation by the member states. These 
provisions include reports of the member states to the Commission on the 
implementation of the respective directive, the publication of these reports by the 
Commission as well as reports of the Commission to the Council. Some directives 
directly involve the European Parliament. The 1978 directive on waste from the 
titanium dioxide industry, for instance, stipulates that the "Commission shall report 
every three years to the Council and the European Parliament on the application 
of this directive."14
14 OJ No L 54,25.2.78, p. 19; for another example see the 1985 directive on environmental impact 




























































































In a more systematic fashion, the Commission since 1984 publishes annual 
reports to Parliament on the implementation of EC law and its own monitoring 
efforts.15 These reports had been demanded by Parliament in a resolution in 1983 
in a move to increase its role in overseeing the application of Community law in 
general.16 They give detailed information on infringements of Community law by 
the member states, of Commission efforts to enforce compliance with Community 
law and of legal proceedings against member states. In its 1989 report, the 
Commission explicitly acknowledged the role of the House in helping in the 
monitoring of EC law by parliamentary questions and petitions. Although these 
reports certainly represent a step forward in strengthening Parliament’s controlling 
function, MEPs have not been satisfied with the information given to them by the 
Commission. The assembly indeed requested that the Commission’s reports contain 
more detailed information.17 Moreover, the Commission was asked to forward to 
Parliament on a regular basis member states’ compliance letters, which notify the 
Commission of the transposition of a directive into national law.18 According to 
the House, infringement procedures against member states for the violation of EC 
environmental law should be made more public. Parliament also encouraged the EC 
citizens to participate in the monitoring of the implementation of EC law by filing 
petitions to Parliament in cases of non-application of Community law.19 Regarding 
citizens’ complaints made to the Commission, Parliament requested the Commission 
"to let the European Parliament examine the complaints which have been received 
if it so requests". These different proposals reflect Parliament’s concern about the 
implementation gap in EC environmental regulation, and its attempt to increase its 
own capacities in this area.
The European Parliament has not waited for information to be provided by the 
Commission, however. It has undertaken its own studies into the implementation
1 See, e.g., the annual report for 1989 (COM(90) 288 final, 22.5.90).
16 OJ No C 68, 14.3.83, p. 32.
17 OJ No C 343, 31.12.85, p. 8; cf also OJ No C 68,19.3.90, p 183.
18 OJ No C 94, 11.4.88, p. 155.




























































































problem in the form of own-initiative reports. A highlight is the environment 
committee’s report on the implementation of EC water legislation by MEP Ken 
Collins.20 At the heart of this report are case studies on the implementation of 
three directives relating to the quality of water which show member states’ failures 
in the incorporation of EC law into national law and in the actual implementation 
of Community law. Most cases referred to in the report are taken from Britain, the 
rapporteur’s home country. The case study approach is employed also in the Alber 
report on the incorporation into national law of Community directives on the 
improvement of the quality of the air.21
An important instrument which the European Parliament has given itself in its 
Rules of Procedure are committees of inquiry set up "to investigate alleged 
contraventions of Community law or instances of maladministration with respect to 
Community responsibilities."22 Committees of inquiry are a means of focussing 
Parliament’s attention as well as media attention on spectacular breaches of EC law 
or urgent problems to be tackled by the Community. In the field of environmental 
policy, the House has set up two committees of inquiry so far. In 1983, the first 
committee of inquiry ever in the European Parliament’s history was established to 
probe into the disappearance of several barrels of toxic waste from the Seveso 
plant. The resolution which Parliament passed on the basis of the resulting report 
stated a breach of the 1978 directive on toxic and dangerous waste and criticized 
the Commission for not adequately fulfilling its role as the guardian of the 
Treaties.23 Another committee of inquiry was set up following the scandal around 
the movement of nuclear materials between Germany and Belgium and related 
illegal financial transactions. This committee did not find any violation of EC law 
but recommended an extension of Community competences in this area and a 
tightening of state control in general.24
20 Doc A 2-298/87,14.2.88.
21 Doc A2-315/87, 26.2.88.
22 See Rules of Procedure (5th edition), Rule 109(3).
23 OJ No C 127, 14.5.84, p. 67; Weber (1984: 67-69).




























































































Besides its involvement in controlling the implementation of EC environmental 
legislation, the European Parliament obviously has a strong interest in following up 
on the response of the Commission and the Council to its own-initiative and 
legislative resolutions. This follow-up is a test of Parliament’s efficacy in influencing 
Community action, and a basis for improving its efficacy by follow-up action.25 The 
"Reports on Action taken by the Commission in Response to Parliament’s Own- 
Initiative Resolutions" have already been mentioned in the previous section. They 
are published by the Commission and specify the steps which the Commission has 
taken on the issues brought up by Parliament. For the follow-up on Parliament’s 
legislative opinions, a special question time is scheduled regularly in each part- 
session on Wednesday evenings. During this question time, one Commissioner 
answers the MEPs’ questions concerning Commission action on Parliament’s 
legislative opinions which had been given during the two previous sessions. On the 
day preceding the question time, MEPs have received a written communication by 
the Commission on this subject.26
On a more technical level, Parliament has provided itself with a special service 
to follow up on the consideration of parliamentary opinions by the Commission and 
the Council. This service is part of Parliament’s secretariat. By keeping up-to-date 
the respective database and sending reminders to the different Parliament offices 
concerned about steps to be taken to ensure an appropriate response by the 
Commission and the Council, the follow-up service helps the House to keep track 
of pending legislative acts. Moreover, it produces statistics on the number of 
parliamentary amendments adopted by the Commission and the Council. As a rule, 
it is expected that the rapporteur or the secretariat of the responsible committee 
observe the further treatment of a legislative matter by the Commission and the 
Council as they are most knowledgeable about it. However, this rarefy works in a 
satisfactory manner.
25 See Rules of Procedure (5th edition), Rules 41 - 43.




























































































The will of the House to strengthen its monitoring capacities across all policy 
areas became clear when it announced the setting-up of a separate monitoring 
committee in 1988.27 This committee was to both follow up on Parliament’s 
opinions and resolutions by the Commission and the Council, and scrutinize the 
implementation of EC law. Up to now, such a committee has not been established. 
This may be due to the understanding that highly policy-specific implementation 
problems cannot adequately be dealt with by a cross-section committee.
Finally, the European Parliament has the right to censure the Commission en 
bloc (Art. 144 EEC), a power which constitutes the ultimate means of control. On 
a more practical level, the
MEPs’ power to "control" the EC’s decision-making bodies has grown 
haphazardly, largely as a result of MEPs’ efforts to exploit the EP’s own 
procedures and to interpret the Rome Treaty’s provisions expansively. 
(Lodge 1982: 273)
Ensuring the accountability of the executive to parliamentary wishes is the essence 
of the parliamentary control function that the European Parliament shares with its 
national counterparts. In the framework of its documentation efforts, Parliament’s 
Directorate General for Research has published individual studies on the response 
of the Commission and the Council to Parliament’s resolutions.28 These reports 
draw a mixed picture of parliamentary successes and failures in influencing the 
course of Community affairs. In addition to that, the European Parliament is 
involved also in the surveillance of the implementation of Community law at the 
national level. As the environment has no natural advocate, and as it is an 
environmentalist lobby, specialized government agencies and the public at large 
which have to act on its behalf, the monitoring function of the European Parliament 
in the area of environmental policy is particularly important.
11 OJ No C 94, 11.4.88, p. 151.
28 There are reports on the "Achievement of the Internal Market: Action Taken by the 
Commission and Council on Parliament’s Opinions" (Action Taken Series no. 1-I./04-1987; no. 1- 
II./05-1988), reports on "The Impact of the European Parliament on Community Policies" (Political 
Series no. 5/1984; Action Taken Series no. 3/1988), and one report on "Action taken on Parliament’s 
Own-Initiative Resolutions (July 1984 - December 1986)" (Action Taken Series no. 22-1/09-1987). 




























































































The participation of a parliament in legislation is probably the function of which 
people think first. In Montesquieu’s ideal type "separation of powers" model, it is 
the parliament which makes the laws, government which executes them and the 
judiciary which controls their application. The Community institutional system being 
strongly technocratic and intergovernmental in its character, the legislative powers 
of the European Parliament are, however, clearly limited. The critique of the 
"democratic deficit" of the EC refers to this fact.
In this chapter, first the role of the European Parliament in the legislative 
process will be described in general terms. Following that, three case studies on 
individual pieces of legislation will be presented for the purpose of illustration.
3.1. The legislative procedures
The part of the European Parliament in the legislative process of the Community 
is governed by two procedures that apply to different sets of legislative acts.
The European Parliament’s role in most Community legislation is governed by 
the consultation procedure which basically limits Parliament to an advisory function. 
The consultation procedure also applies to the new Treaty chapter on the 
environment (Arts 130r - 130t EEC) which has been introduced by the Single Act 
in 1987. Within the consultation procedure, the European Parliament gives its 
opinion on the Commission’s draft legislative proposal, and the Council can make 
a decision on this proposal only after having obtained Parliament’s opinion. Yet, the 
Council need not heed Parliament’s opinion, and mostly indeed does not. However, 
as the Commission is free to alter its original proposal at any time as long as the 
Council has not acted (Art. 149, par. 3 EEC), the Commission may take up 
Parliament’s suggestions and incorporate them into its own proposal.
A second legislative procedure was introduced by the Single Act. The new 
cooperation procedure, which involves the Commission, the European Parliament 
and the Council of Ministers and is laid down in Art. 149 EEC, provides for an




























































































enlarged possibility of qualified majority voting in the Council and a strengthening 
of the position of the European Parliament vis-à-vis the other institutions. The 
cooperation procedure applies mainly to legislation related to the completion of the 
internal market.
The European Parliament is involved in the cooperation procedure in two 
readings. In the first reading, Parliament gives its opinion on the Commission draft 
proposal. This opinion mostly contains proposals for amendments to the 
Commission proposal. After having obtained Parliament’s opinion, the Council 
adopts a common position on the Commission draft proposal. This common 
position is the object of Parliament’s second reading. If Parliament agrees to the 
common position, the Council adopts the legislative act in accordance with the 
common position. If Parliament rejects the common position, the Council may pass 
the law only by a unanimous vote. This provision thus enables Parliament to block 
legislation if the Council is split on the matter. The possibility to reject a common 
position is a powerful weapon for Parliament. However, only in those cases in which 
a deal is struck between the House, the Commission and possibly the Council 
against the background of Parliament’s threat to reject the common position does 
it represent an avenue for the inclusion of the House’s wishes into the legislative 
act and go beyond a pure veto power.
A more intricate process is opened up if Parliament proposes amendments to 
the common position. These amendments have first to be considered by the 
Commission which may either accept or reject them. If the Commission accepts 
(some or all) parliamentary amendments it sends a so-called "re-examined proposal" 
to the Council. The Council can then by a unanimity vote adopt parliamentary 
amendments which have not been accepted by the Commission. More importantly 
in practice, the re-examined proposal from the Commission, which includes 
Parliament’s amendments, only needs a qualified majority in the Council to pass. 
In order to change the re-examined proposal from the Commission, however, the 
Council has to act with unanimity. This means that the European Parliament in 




























































































internally divided.29 The cooperation procedure therefore has at least the potential 
for strengthening Parliament’s influence in the legislative process, especially when 
Parliament succeeds in convincing the Commission of its position.
In practical terms, two additional procedural requirements for the cooperation 
procedure are important for the internal workings of Parliament. First, in order to 
reject or amend the Council’s common position Parliament has to vote with the 
absolute majority of its component members. At present this means that at least 260 
of the 518 MEPs have to vote for the rejection or amendment for it to be valid. As 
the attendance of Parliament’s plenary sessions is often wanting, this provision 
necessitates a special effort by Parliament to ensure sufficient attendance in those 
sessions in which votes on common positions are on the agenda. Moreover, the 
absolute majority provision forces Parliament to form issue-oriented coalitions 
across party lines for the rejection or amendment of common positions as no single 
party group commands 260 votes by itself. For this purpose, the European People’s 
Party and the Socialists as the two biggest party groups in Parliament hold a 
coordination meeting on Tuesday of each part-session before votes on common 
positions take place. In these meetings, a common line can often be agreed upon.
Parliament has adopted yet another rule concerning the cooperation procedure. 
In its Rules of Procedure, Parliament has laid down that amendments in the second 
reading, i.e. concerning the common position, may only either aim at restoring a 
position adopted by Parliament in the first reading, or seek to propose a 
compromise between the Council and Parliament, or refer to a new provision in the 
draft proposal which had been included after the first reading.30 These restrictions 
imply that substantive amendments may only be tabled in the first reading. The 
second reading only serves to respond to changes in the legislative proposal as 
submitted in the form of the Council’s common position, to propose compromise 
solutions, and to insist on Parliament’s position as voiced in the first reading. It is 
therefore in the first reading that Parliament develops and puts forward its opinion.
29 The division in the Council obviously has to be such that still a qualified majority is in favour 
of the re-examined Commission proposal.




























































































As mentioned above, the consultation procedure with its restricted scope for 
parliamentary influence applies to environmental policy in general.31 However, 
much environmental legislation is related to the completion of the internal market 
and is therefore dealt with under the cooperation procedure which concedes more 
power to the European Parliament. The so-called Delors-List, in fact, which 
specified the legislation the legal basis of which would be changed by the Single Act 
according to the Commission’s point of view, included a substantial part of 
environmental legislation under the provisions of Arts 100a/149 EEC (Roelants du 
Vivier/Hannequart 1988: 229-231). Arguably, environmental legislation related to 
the internal market programme is even more important than environmental 
legislation coming under the consultation procedure as it directly affects the 
competition conditions between the member states and the freedom of trade. Both 
its economic and its environmental ramifications are often bigger. This means that 
even now many significant pieces of EC environmental legislation are decided under 
the cooperation procedure giving the European Parliament more influence in the 
policy-making process.
An important question is exactly which pieces of environmental legislation are 
to be decided according to Art. 130s EEC under the consultation procedure, and 
which on the basis of Art. 100a EEC within the cooperation procedure. In practice, 
the Commission when tabling a proposal decides on which legal basis it is to be 
processed. While in general the European Parliament has accepted the 
Commission’s choice of a legal basis, Parliament’s Graziani Report on the results 
obtained from the Single Act pointed to the arbitrary character of those decisions 
particularly in the field of environmental legislation (and social rights).32 At the 
moment, there are two cases pending at the EC Court of Justice regarding the
31 Interestingly, according to Art. 130s EEC, the Council may decide from case to case that a 
decision is taken by qualified majority also in environmental policy not related to the completion of 
the internal market. As Lietzmann (1988:179-181) notes, however, a certain inconsistency lies in the 
fact that in these cases Parliament does not enjoy enlarged rights of participation under the 
cooperation procedure. In other Treaty provisions, Council decisions to be taken with qualified 
majority are linked to the application of the cooperation procedure.




























































































appropriateness of the legal basis for specific legislative proposals in the 
environmental policy field. In the first one, the European Parliament has gone to 
the Court against the Council for the latter having based its Regulation No 3954/87 
on radioactivity in foodstuffs and feedingstuffs on Art. 31 EAEC instead of Art. 
100a EEC as preferred by Parliament. The Commission had refused to choose Art. 
100a EEC as the legal basis. In the other case, concerning Directive 89/428/EEC 
on waste from the titaniumdioxyde industry, it is the Commission which has sued 
the Council for basing the directive on Art. 130s EEC instead of Art. 100a EEC, 
and by doing so disregarding Parliament’s rights of participation in the legislative 
procedure.
As a general rule, Parliament wants the cooperation procedure to be extended 
to other policy areas beyond internal market legislation, and the environmental area 
would be an obvious candidate. Environment-related legislation already makes up 
for nearly a tenth (18 out of 193) of all cooperation procedures. Between July 1987 
and August 1990, 12 environment-related cooperation procedures have been 
completed, and an additional 6 have been started. This number compares to 57 
consultation procedures for the period from July 1987 to March 1991. Parliament 
has nearly always worked to use its potential influence through the cooperation 
procedure. In all completed environment-related cooperation procedures up to 
August 1990, the European Parliament has in at least one of the two readings 
proposed amendments to the Commission proposal or the Council’s common 
position.33 Indeed, this observation confirms a trend which has characterized the 
environment-related consultation procedures over several years. Also with 
legislation subject to the consultation procedure the opinions proposing 
amendments to the Commission proposal outnumbered the opinions which did not 
do so. Both observations reflect the active interest that Parliament has taken in 
environmental policy.
33 Source: EPOQUE database, own analysis. For the purpose of this analysis, environment-related 
legislation was defined as excluding biotechnology but including legislation on the workplace 




























































































The first time that Parliament rejected a common position was in the case of the 
proposed Council directive on the protection of workers from benzene at the 
workplace. This directive at that time fell into the competence of Parliament’s 
environment committee. In its session of 12 October 1988, Parliament adopted a 
number of amendments to the Council’s common position. After the Commissioner 
present had stated that the Commission would not accept these amendments, 
Parliament, on the proposal of its rapporteur, rejected the common position with 
a large majority.34 Reportedly, the Commission had previously assured Parliament 
of its support for Parliament’s proposals. As at least one member state in the 
Council supported Parliament’s views and a unanimity vote to overrule Parliament’s 
rejection was thus not possible, the Commission subsequently withdrew its proposal 
(Kraus 1989). Parliament had thereby effectively blocked legislation that it 
considered inadequate and sent a powerful signal to the two other Community 
organs.
The question which ensues from our discussion of the legislative procedures so 
far, and which indeed is at the centre of this chapter, is what impact Parliament had 
with its amendments on the legislative process both under the consultation and 
under the cooperation procedure. Concerning the experience with the cooperation 
procedure in general - i.e. not limited to the field of environmental policy -, the 
Graziani Report of Parliament’s institutional affairs committee, one year after the 
entering into force of the Single Act, drew up a mixed assessment.35 As to the first 
reading, the report stated that
(w)hile Parliament has some reason to be satisfied at the Commission’s 
acceptance of its amendments, it cannot congratulate itself on their success with 
the Council. (...) only some 40% of Parliament’s amendments are incorporated 
in the Council’s common positions, (p. 16)
As to the second stage of the cooperation procedure,
Parliament held 33 second readings and approved 18 common positions without 
amendment. No common positions have yet been rejected. In 15 cases it 
proposed amendments. However, less than a quarter of these amendments were
34 OJ No C 290, 14.11.88, pp. 36, 64.




























































































included in the texts adopted by the Council. The Commission for its part 
accepted just over half of the amendments proposed by Parliament at its second 
reading, (p. 17)
Thus, despite some inroads which have been made "the overall results leave much 
to be desired." (p. 17) Since 1988, the number of parliamentary amendments 
adopted by the Commission and the Council has not changed markedly.36
A corresponding analysis for the working of the cooperation procedure 
specifically in environmental policy and up to the present date has not been possible 
within the scope of this paper. It should also be recalled that the major part of EC 
environmental policy is still subject to the consultation procedure, and that pure 
numbers of amendments adopted by the Commission and the Council are not 
conclusive in that the substance of the amendments has to be taken into account. 
Only case studies can reveal the true impact of the European Parliament on 
legislation.
Finally, a third form of interaction between the Commission, the Council and 
Parliament besides the consultation and the cooperation procedures is worth 
mentioning. Based on an inter-institutional agreement of 1975, the conciliation 
procedure allows a mediation between the Council and Parliament (with the 
participation of the Commission) in the case of disagreements about pieces of non­
mandatory legislation with important financial implications. Parliament has been 
eager to reform this procedure, and in particular to extend it to all important 
legislative acts regardless of their financial implications.37 It has provided for this 
unilaterally in its Rules of Procedure.38 Such an extension, however, has been 
refused by the Council so far. Despite this refusal in principle, direct contacts 
between Parliament and the Council do take place. Shortly after a move within the 
Council to use the conciliation procedure more flexibly, which, however, had been 
vetoed by Denmark, the European Parliament in December 1984 for the first time
36 See XXIIIrd General Report on the Activities of the European Communities 1989, p. 31; 
XXIVth General Report on the Activities of the European Communities 1990, p. 360.
37 See Parliament’s Prag Report on the conciliation procedure (Doc A2-351/88, 11.1.89), with 
further references.




























































































initiated a conciliation procedure according to its own Rules of Procedure.39 This 
initiative concerned draft legislation on the lead content of petrol and motor vehicle 
emissions. While the Council declined a formal conciliation procedure because the 
conditions of the 1975 agreement were not met, a meeting between a parliamentary 
delegation and the acting president of the Environment Council took place on 6 
March 1985. Although Parliament remained unsatisfied with the outcome of this 
meeting, it was important in so far as it showed a certain flexibility in the practice 
of direct talks between Council and Parliament. Moreover, for several years, there 
have been regular informal meetings between the presidents of the European 
Parliament, the Commission and the Council.
It was said in the introduction that the European Parliament wants to be seen 
as a spokesman for environmental concerns. In a negative vein, the criticism is 
frequently heard that the European Parliament is a mere talking-shop which has not 
to be taken seriously. The interaction between the limited powers of Parliament 
which prevent it from exercising more leverage, and the danger of acquiring a 
reputation of being an ineffective body the powers of which should better not be 
enlarged, potentially is a vicious circle for the European Parliament (Lodge 1982: 
262). The following case studies will look at how Parliament used its limited powers 
to enhance the goal of environmental protection in the EC. As a general rule, which 
will be illustrated by the case studies, the House in its legislative work critically 
accompanies the policy-making of the Commission and the Council and proposes 
more radically "green" solutions. As may be expected, however, these proposals are 
mostly not adopted by the Commission and the Council.
3.2. Case studies on the participation o f Parliament in the legislative process
Before presenting the three case studies on the role played by the European 
Parliament in environmental legislation, a methodological caveat must be entered. 
The analyst who aims at going beyond the mere description of Parliament’s actions
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to "measure" the impact of these actions in the policy-making process will encounter 
severe problems. In general, a single direct causal influence cannot be assumed. The 
decisions of the Commission and the Council of Ministers are determined by a host 
of different considerations among which Parliament’s opinion is only one, and 
possibly a very marginal one. In the Council, the "common interest" of the EC is 
mostly overridden by the various national interests and the horsetrading between 
them. Other important factors are lobbying by individual interest groups, the 
general political context (e.g. media attention, up-coming elections, broader political 
considerations not related to the issue at stake) and international developments 
(e.g. negotiations on international agreements). All of these factors may further or 
hinder the adoption of Parliament’s proposals by the Commission and the Council. 
Even if a proposal is adopted this may not mean that "Parliament got its way" but 
may only reflect that circumstances were favourable and Parliament’s ideas in line 
with these circumstances. Only under the cooperation procedure true power accrues 
to the assembly under certain conditions. Thus, the influence of the European 
Parliament is a thing which is hard to trace, and only in-depth studies can provide 
answers. In such an analysis, we would have to take into account not only the 
actions taken by the House but also all other factors which had an effect on the 
decision. Only a whole series of such analyses would enable us to draw more 
general conclusions - if generalisation is at all possible.
Case study 1: The Large Combustion Plant Directive o f 198840
An example of the disregard for Parliament’s proposals by the Commission and the 
Council is the legislative process leading to the Large Combustion Plant Directive 
of 1988. A detailed analysis of Parliament’s Directorate General for Research on 
the influence of Parliament on this directive shows that only marginal parliamentary 
amendments have been included in the final act.41
40 Council Directive 88/609/EEC (OJ No L 336, 7.12.88, p. l) .




























































































The legislative process around the Large Combustion Plant Directive was drawn- 
out and characterized by strong national interests. The Commission’s first proposal 
had been submitted in late 1983, with Parliament giving its opinion in 1984. After 
a modification of its draft by the Commission in 1985 and two resolutions by 
Parliament in 1985 and 1986, which strongly criticized both the Commission and the 
Council for their inaction and disregard of Parliament’s proposals, and urged more 
stringent regulations42, the directive was finally adopted by the Council in 
November 1988.
The comparison between the proposals made by Parliament and the final 
directive reveal that the parliamentary amendments accepted by the Council either 
referred to definitions or went in the way of some member states by allowing them 
to impose shorter deadlines of compliance. These changes are thus all but 
substantial. In fact, none of Parliament’s demands concerning obligatory shorter 
deadlines, an extension of emission norms to other categories of plants and stricter 
conditions for exemptions from the provisions laid down in the directive were 
adopted. It was these demands, however, which would have increased the level of 
environmental protection and would have imposed additional efforts on the member 
states and their industries. In purely quantitative terms, out of the 22 amendments 
proposed by Parliament eight were adopted by the Commission. These eight 
amendments were those which were less important. Out of these eight amendments 
supported by the Commission three were included in the directive by the Council. 
The author of the study concludes that Parliament’s influence on the Large 
Combustion Plant Directive was small. Even the Commission proposals, however, 
were only scarcely reflected in the directive. The case of the Large Combustion 
Plant Directive shows the predominance of intergovernmental decision-making and 
the exclusion of the European Parliament when important national interests are at 
stake.




























































































Case study 2: Car exhaust emission legislation - The Small Car Directive o f 1989°
One of the most striking instances in which the Single Act changed a Community 
legislative process is EC legislation on emissions from motor vehicles.43 4 When the 
Single Act entered into force in July 1987, the draft directive on emission norms for 
motor vehicles had been blocked for one and a half years by a Danish veto in the 
Council. This draft directive had been the result of tedious negotiations between the 
Commission and the member states which to those involved became known as the 
Luxemburg Compromise. The situation since the fall of 1985 reflected in an ideal 
type manner the stalemate in EC politics brought about by the unanimity 
requirement for Council decisions.
Under the Single Act, the Commission immediately acted to remove the obstacle 
for the passing of the directive. It re-tabled the Luxemburg Compromise on the 
basis of the new internal market clause Art. 100a EEC, thus opening the way for 
a qualified majority vote in the Council. Art. 100a EEC was appropriate in that EC 
car exhaust legislation primarily serves to eliminate barriers to trade for such an 
important commodity as are motor vehicles. As a matter of fact, it had only been 
since the mid-1980s that car emission control had become a major focus of 
environmental policy. After the Council, acting under the cooperation procedure, 
had formulated its common position in September 1987, and after Parliament had 
approved the Council’s common position ten weeks later, the Council passed the 
directive against the votes of Denmark and Greece on 3 December 1987. Indeed, 
this was the first time that a directive was approved with a qualified majority under 
Art. 100a EEC.
The directive of 1987 stipulated that the Council even before the end of 1987 
must decide on a tightening-up of emission norms for small cars (under 1400 ccm). 
The politics around this further legislation show the impact which the European
43 Council Directive 89/458/EEC (OJ No L 226, 3.8.89, p. 1).




























































































Parliament can have in Community legislation under the cooperation procedure if 
it has the Commission on its side.
In accordance with the 1987 directive, the Commission, with some delay, in 
February 1988, tabled a proposal for small cars which was again based on Art. 100a 
EEC.45 This proposal provided for the extension to small cars of the (stricter) 1987 
norms for medium-size cars. The new Small Car Directive was thus to practically 
eliminate separate, more lenient norms for the category of small cars. This ran 
against the cornerstone of the Luxemburg Compromise which had consisted in the 
distinction between three different categories of cars (small, medium-size and big) 
with less severe norms for smaller than for bigger cars. Against the background of 
difficult negotiations on this matter, which were highly politicised and remained 
continuously on the verge of failure, the Council reached a general agreement in 
June 1988 and a formal common position in November 1988. The common position 
was adopted with a qualified majority against the opposition of Denmark, Greece 
and the Netherlands, and on the whole followed the February 1988 Commission 
proposal as far as the emission limit values were concerned. However, it stipulated 
that in a third step before the end of 1991 the norms for small cars would again be 
tightened up, and thus reflected the pressure of the more environmentalist member 
states on the Commission and the other member states to move into the direction 
of a more stringent motor vehicle emission law.
The European Parliament gave a first opinion on the Small Car Directive on 14 
September 1988.46 In this opinion, it proposed setting more stringent standards 
than provided for in the Commission proposal. Furthermore, Parliament called for 
an extension of these standards, which required the introduction of the three-way 
catalytic converter with electronic fuel injection as the most advanced technological 
solution, to all categories of cars. However, the Council’s common position did not 
take into account Parliament’s will.
45 COM(87)706 final, 10.2.88.




























































































Parliament’s vote on the Council’s common position was on the agenda in April 
1989. In a conciliatory move towards Parliament, the Commission, some days before 
the session of the House, proposed to anticipate certain deadlines and make the 
standards obligatory (Europe Bulletin, 7.4.89, p. 5).47 Going beyond that, 
Environment Commissioner Ripa di Meana, one day before the final vote in the 
plenary, also proposed stricter limit values than those advocated hitherto by the 
Commission and contained in the Council’s common position. These limit values 
basically met Parliament’s demands which it had voiced in September 1988 while 
allowing for some flexibility for the negotiations in the Council. In view of threats 
within the European Parliament that Parliament would reject the common position, 
Ripa di Meana urged MEPs to amend the common position in the light of his new 
proposals (Europe Bulletin, 13.4.89, pp. 8f).
As the House could now count on the support of the Commission, it amended 
the common position within the limits set by the Commission and in accordance 
with its proposals of September 1988 on 12 April 1989.48 At the same time, it 
dropped two proposals which it had made in September 1988 but which the 
Commission said it could not accept. Following the vote, Commissioner Ripa di 
Meana expressed his satisfaction with this outcome which showed that the 
"Commission and the European Parliament were able to coordinate their action in 
order to establish the necessary conditions to reach the objectives they have in 
common." (Europe Bulletin, 14.4.89, p. 8) In sum, the events around Parliament’s 
vote on the Small Car Directive showed the Commission as in the end being willing 
to give up its original position and support Parliament’s demands. The vote in the 
House was taken with near-unanimity and could be seen as an uncompromising call 
of the European Parliament for a tougher EC environmental policy in the light of 
the upcoming European elections in June 1989.
47 Up to then, emission standards had not been mandatory. Rather, member states were allowed 
to permit the use of motor vehicles which did not meet the limit values (optional harmonization of 
standards).




























































































According to the cooperation procedure provisions of Art. 149 EEC, the 
Commission re-examined its draft directive in the light of Parliament’s opinion on 
the common position and made it conform with Parliament’s wishes. For the 
Council this meant that it could adopt Parliament’s and the Commission’s proposals 
with a qualified majority. For the Council to amend the proposal, however, a 
unanimity vote was required. After long discussions and some slight changes on the 
re-examined Commission proposal, the Council formally adopted the Small Car 
Directive with a qualified majority against the votes of Denmark and Greece on 18 
July 1989. Parliament’s proposals had thus found their way into the final act.
The political process leading up to the Small Car Directive of 1989 is indicative 
of the political dynamics which can evolve under the cooperation procedure. 
Moreover, Parliament itself sees this directive as a major success in pushing through 
more stringent environmental standards. Certainly, the final stage of the legislative 
process in the spring of 1989 highlights the possibility offered by an internally 
divided Council for joint action by Parliament and the Commission. At the same 
time, however, it shows how much successful Parliament action even under the 
cooperation procedure depends on favourable preconditions that are beyond its 
control.
First, as Corcelle (1989: 522) points out, the general political background has to 
be considered. With a view to the upcoming European elections in June 1989, 
Parliament wanted to present itself as a motor of EC environmental policy, and its 
quasi-unanimous vote on tougher emission standards in April 1989 precisely served 
this purpose. The Small Car Directive in that way became the test case for 
Parliament’s environmental ambitions which might have focused also on some other 
issue. Nevertheless, the case was well chosen as the political situation in the Council 
was known and the chance for exploiting it was obvious. Moreover, it was difficult 
under these circumstances for the Commission (and the Council) not to go along 
with Parliament’s wishes if it did not want to discredit both Parliament’s 
participation in the legislative process and EC environmental policy in general. It 
must also be noted that some of Parliament’s claims were probably more of a 




























































































As the three-way catalytic converter with electronic fuel injection is the most 
advanced technical solution to reducing car emissions, it is of little practical value 
to set an incrementally stricter standard although even the originally proposed 
standard requires the use of this technical device (Corcelle 1989: 522).
Second, it would certainly be misleading to say that Parliament forced its will 
on the Commission and the Council. Rather, its impact was inserted in the political 
context the development of which was outside of Parliament’s reach.
The original Commission proposal of February 1988 was strictly opposed both 
by those who objected to stricter norms, led by the French car maker Peugeot, and 
by those to whom the Commission proposal did not go far enough in the way of 
environmental protection, i.e. Denmark and Greece. Other member states - West 
Germany, the Netherlands - were working to tighten up the Commission proposal 
but were willing to compromise. Against this strange coalition between proponents 
and opponents of strict standards the Commission had difficulties in securing even 
a qualified majority in the Council. In the course of 1988, this situation changed. 
The resistance of French and Italian car manufacturers who had up to then opposed 
more stringent emission norms mainly for small cars, weakened. This development 
released both the Commission and the Italian and the French governments from 
pressure working against the adoption of stricter standards. Consequently, in the 
Council the basis for a Commission-induced compromise became broader. As the 
resistance to stricter norms was now mitigated, only those member states who 
unconditionally wanted more stringent norms remained opposed to the Commission 
proposals. This group, however, did not command enough votes to block the 
passage of the proposed directive. For the Commission this meant that it could 
support Parliament as long as this did not arouse new resistance amongst the 
former opponents of stricter standards. As Parliament’s claims did not pose this 
problem, the tabling of a Commission proposal along the lines of these claims 
became possible.
In sum, the European Parliament benefitted from a decline in resistance against 
relatively strict emission standards and reaped the fruits of a mature political 




























































































to such standards, Parliament would not have been able to score this success even 
under the cooperation procedure and even with the support of the Commission. In 
this case, it would have been difficult to secure a qualified majority in the Council 
for any proposal.
Case study 3: The Directive on the freedom o f access to information on the 
environment49
Legislation on public access to information held by public authorities is an impor­
tant procedural element in environmental law. An EC directive in this area was 
passed by the Council in June 1990. As it is based on Article 130s EEC, the legisla­
tive process leading up to this directive offers another example of the involvement 
of the European Parliament within the consultation procedure. However, the history 
of the access to information issue in the EC goes back to before the start of the 
actual legislative process.
In the first place, access to information in general - i.e. not limited to the 
environment field - is a precondition for the performance of parliamentary functions 
and therefore of crucial importance to each parliament itself. In the case of the 
European Community, the inter-governmental character of much of EC politics 
stands against the openness of policy-making. Indeed, the call for more transparency 
in the Community system is just one aspect of the European Parliament’s more 
general struggle for increased powers, and it has been reiterated again and again. 
In a resolution in 1984, the European Parliament considered "that the European 
Community should have its own legislation on openness of government of 
Community affairs".50 Among other things, it urged the publication of explanatory 
declarations made in the Council together with the relevant directive or regulation 
as well as of the notifications of the member states to the Commission on the 
transposition of EC law into national law. Declarations by individual delegations in 
the Council on the interpretation of new legislation are said to alter the regulatory
49 Council Directive 90/313/EEC (OJ No L 158, 23.6.90, p. 56).




























































































content of legislation and thus to be a form of secret legislation. The non­
publication of transposition notifications, which seems hard to justify by any 
objective standards, hinders parliamentary and public monitoring on the 
implementation of Community law. Both these elements of secrecy still clearly limit 
the democratic nature of the Community system.
A special focus of attention is free access to information in the field of 
environmental pollution. An attempt to tackle this problem was made by the 
European Parliament in 1986/87 but ended in failure. On the basis of a motion 
tabled by Beate Weber and Ken Collins, at that time respectively chairwoman and 
vice-chairman of Parliament’s environment committee, the green-alternative MEP 
Bram van der Lek drafted a report on "public access to environmental pollution 
information".51 This report (plus an additional working document) contained a 
substantial study of the problems relating to public access to environment-related 
data and information which drew on the experience with comparable legislation in 
some EC member states and the US. The motion for a resolution attached to the 
report called on the Community to legislate on freedom of information for the 
working both of the EC system itself and of national public authorities. This motion, 
however, failed miserably in the plenary. After its cornerstones had been rejected 
in separate votes, and the motion thus been transformed into a nearly meaningless 
document, it was only the Liberals, the Group of the European Renewal and some 
communists who approved the motion while a large majority of socialists, christian- 
democrats and others voted against. In any case, only 177 members participated in 
the final vote at all.52 In sum, with an obvious lack of plenary attendance and 
inconsistent voting behaviour Parliament forewent the opportunity to exercise well- 
founded leadership on the freedom of information issue. It then became a 
Commission’s move to announce the intention to make appropriate proposals in this 
area in the fourth environmental action programme in 1987.53
51 Doc A  2-30/87, 13.4.87.
52 Minutes of the sitting, OJ No C 156,15.6.87, pp. 91f; cf. vwd 15.5.87, Europe Bulletin, 16.5.87,
p l3 .




























































































The legislative process started when in 1988 the Commission submitted a "propo­
sal for a council directive on the freedom of access to information on the environ­
ment".54 While not including at that stage regulations for the access to 
environment-related information at the level of Community institutions themselves 
and limiting itself to requiring the member states to adopt freedom of information 
legislation, this proposal corresponded in its central provisions with the suggestions 
contained in the 1987 van der Lek report. The proposed rules comprised the 
obligation of authorities to supply not only final but also (finished) internal working 
documents; the right of access to information to all natural or legal persons regard­
less of their nationality, place of residence or place of business, a regulation which 
is important in relation to transfrontier pollution; the limitation of charges to the 
actual costs of photocopying documents; the obligation of authorities to help the 
applicant in finding relevant documents; the possibility of administrative and judicial 
recourse; and the obligation of member states to publish a report on the state of 
the environment every three years.
In comparison with the van der Lek report the Commission proposal fell short 
in not extending freedom of information duties to industry. Although not in clearly 
specified terms, the report had implied such an obligation, and Parliament had 
backed up this claim in its resolution on the fourth environmental action 
programme.55 More specifically, in the motion attached to the report, "the right 
of access to information on the environment at the workplace for organizations 
representing workers" had been called for.56 The workplace environment was not 
included in the Commission proposal, perhaps for reasons of legislative consistency.
The main problem, however, even at first glance, was the definition of cases in 
which public access to information could be restricted. While it was not so much the 
list of such exemptions which differed between the van der Lek report and the 
Commission proposal (national security, potential damage to foreign relations, trade 
and industrial secrecy, protection of privacy, secrecy of legal procedures), it was the
OJ No C 335, 30.12.88, p. 5.
OJ No C 156,15.6.87, p. 138.




























































































omitted this provision. Had it known of the Council’s intention, Parliament would 
probably have strongly objected to this.
As far as the justification for a request for information, which could be 
demanded from the applicant, is concerned, a clear assessment is difficult. While 
the Commission put forward that the request "indicate as accurately as possible" 
(original proposal) /  "give an accurate indication" (amended proposal) of its 
purpose, the European Parliament wanted the application to contain "a reasonable 
indication of the purpose of the request". As "reasonable" seems to be less 
demanding than "accurate", Parliament’s formulation seems to go in the direction 
of a lesser need for justification on the part of the applicant. The directive in the 
end stipulated that a "request for information may be refused (...) where the request 
is manifestly unreasonable or formulated in too general a manner." All these 
formulations are obviously open to many interpretations. On a general level, this 
comparison illustrates the difficulties involved in comparing the final legislative act 
with the proposals made by the Commission and the European Parliament.
As to the obligation of public authorities to explain the refusal of a request for 
information, on the other hand, the assembly, while basically going along with the 
Commission’s proposal, demanded an additional clause. This clause stipulated that 
in the case that only parts of some body of information are made public the 
authority must "explain" the omissions and indicate where they had been made. This 
clause was taken up by the Commission in relation to the indication of the 
omissions (not their explanation). Nothing of all that, however, can be found in the 
final directive.
Probably the hottest issue in each piece of legislation on the freedom of 
information are the conditions in which a request for information may be refused. 
Obviously, there are always (true or hidden) reasons for public authorities to deny 
citizens access to information. The problem then is how to legally define the limits 
within which the publication of information can be refused. The European 
Parliament made its most crucial demands precisely in this area.
As already noted above, the Commission’s draft directive was quite generous as 




























































































regulations were vaguely formulated, and, apart from the possibility of 
administrative and legal recourse open to the applicant, no checks on the use of the 
exemption clauses were provided for. While the first van der Lek report had already 
agreed to the need for certain exemptions, it had also insisted on the necessity to 
clearly delimit their scope. The second van der Lek report put forward as 
guidelines, firstly, that "exceptions should be kept to a minimum, and there should 
always be an assessment of the relative merits of disclosure and the damage that 
this would cause", i.e. a cost/benefit-analysis, which would be open to scrutiny; and, 
secondly, that "information about discharges - into the air, into water or in the form 
of dumped waste - should never be subject to secrecy."61 Both these rules became 
part of Parliament’s legislative opinion on the draft directive, but neither of them 
was adopted by the Commission or the Council.62
Taking a general comparative look at the two (the original and the amended) 
Commission proposals, Parliament’s legislative opinion and the final Council 
directive, the following picture emerges. In its general profile, the final directive 
corresponds to the cornerstones of a freedom of information act as outlined in the 
van der Lek report of 1987: Access to information is not restricted to the respective 
country’s nationals; the applicant does not have to prove a specific personal interest 
in the information; even (completed) internal documents must be made public; 
there is a limited catalogue of reasons for which access to information may be 
denied; refusals of requests must be explained by the respective authority, and there 
must be a right of appeal; the costs of the provision of information to the applicant 
must remain within certain limits; and, lastly, there exists an obligation of 
government to actively inform its citizens about the state of the environment. These 
general rules are a consensus between the Commission, the European Parliament 
and the Council. The discussion now focuses on how exactly these general rules are 
to be applied, and how much leeway is to be left to the member states to regulate
61 Doc A2-424/88, 7.3.89, pp. Ilf.
62 A more specific amendment proposal of the report which had provided for the extension of 
the obligation to disclose data on emissions to military installations had already been rejected in the 




























































































on these issues. While the European Parliament in its amendments voted for more 
freedom of information and advocated regulations limiting the leeway of the 
national legislators, the Commission and the Council clearly did not want to push 
freedom of information too far. Remember, however, that also within the European 
Parliament there was considerable opposition against "too much" freedom of 
information (see above).
In sum, Parliament on the whole agreed with the draft directive and tried to 
tighten it up on individual points.63 The amendments proposed by Parliament 
related to the scope of the directive, the ease of citizens’ access to information and 
the obligation of public authorities to explain refusals of access, and the strict 
limitation of conditions under which requests for information could be refused. The 
amended Commission proposal clearly accommodated more of Parliament’s wishes 
than the final directive as passed by the Council.64 However, the crucial proposals 
by Parliament, especially the close delimitation of exceptions in which access to 
information could be refused, did not find their way either into the Commission’s 
amended proposal or the final Council directive.
Due to its limited powers, the European Parliament, unlike its national 
counterparts, is not in the position actually to "make" legislation. In the worst case, 
its role is constrained to that of an advisory body whose views are not taken heed 
of by the Commission and the Council. Under propitious circumstances, especially 
under the cooperation procedure, the House becomes a co-player in the legislative 
process, standing beside the two other Community organs.
63 Interestingly, a different stance was taken by the Economic and Social Committee in its opinion 
on the Commission proposal (OJ No C 139, 5.6.89, p. 47). The Economic and Social Committee 
questioned the need for any Community regulation on access to information on the national level in 
view of the subsidiarity principle. Rather, the EC should legislate on freedom of information for its 
own affairs as soon as possible. In its comments on individual provisions the Committee proposed 
clarifications as well as, to some extent, further restrictions of public access rights. However, it also 
suggested an improvement of active information measures.
64 Besides the amendments discussed above, the Commission also adopted a new, generally 




























































































The three case studies presented above have illustrated both the limited role of 
the European Parliament in the legislative process and how it fulfils this role. Only 
in the case of the Small Car Directive could the House influence legislation more 
than marginally. Here, MEPs benefitted from favourable developments beyond their 
control. With the Large Combustion Plant Directive and the Freedom of 
Information Directive, Parliament’s input was small. Besides, all three examples 
have shown that Parliament pushes for a "better", i.e. more complete or more 
radical approach to environmental problems by claiming higher standards, shorter 
deadlines and fewer exceptions.
It can be argued that precisely because the European Parliament has so little say 
in Community politics, it is much freer to propose radical solutions - radical in the 
sense that they may be appropriate for solving one problem but do not take into 
account political and financial constraints. This argument relates to the criticism 
that Parliament is a mere talking-shop and not to be taken seriously. There is surely 
also some truth in this point. One may suspect that there is a tendency in every 
powerless parliament towards the expression of all different and even contradictory 
interests without ensuring overall coherence between the various claims. Actually, 
this tendency may be reinforced in the case of the European Parliament as the 
financial and political burden of EC legislation often has to be born not by the EC 
but by the member states. On the other hand, it has to be said that it is the 
Commission and the House which work against the logic of the lowest common 
denominator which may often prevail in the Council.
As the European Community is a political entity which goes beyond 
international, intergovernmental cooperation and has the power to pass binding 
legislation, the present state of affairs is certainly not satisfactory from a democratic 
legitimation point of view. As a directly elected body, the House should have a 
larger say in legislation which falls into Community competence. It should be a true 
co-decision-maker in EC affairs, without negating the part to be played by the 




























































































to the rule that the EC should take action only where the goal of environmental 
protection was better attained by Community than by member states’ action (i.e. the 
subsidiarity principle), Parliament insisted on concurrent legislation for the EC. New 
national environment-related regulation was to enter into force only if the 
Community did not act within certain time limits after the notification to the 
Commission of the new regulation. Although checked by the subsidiarity principle, 
this provision would mean a considerable gain in powers for the EC. None of 
Parliament’s proposals which would have strengthened Community competences in 
the environmental policy field found its way into the Single Act.71
A new occasion for Parliament to urge an enlargement of Community 
competences in environmental policy is the present intergovernmental conference 
on the creation of a European Union. In a resolution in 1990, Parliament called for 
an amendment of the Treaties to include as an objective of EC environmental 
policy the "contributing to international action against the dangers threatening the 
ecological equilibrium of the planet", and proposed the establishment of a European 
Environment Fund.72 Otherwise, Community competences in environmental policy 
were considered adequate on condition that their exercise be subjected to majority 
voting in the Council and increased rights of participation for the European 
Parliament. To what extent an enlargement of the EC’s role in the area of 
environmental policy is at all desirable is obviously open to debate. By being 
satisfied with the present powers conferred on the EC in its 1990 resolution on the 
intergovernmental conference and not repeating the claim for EC concurrent 
legislation, the House may have wisely shelved earlier proposals which overshot the 
mark.
71 In addition to these crucial institutional amendments, the House proposed the inclusion into 
the EEC Treaty of a definition of the content of environmental policy. Similarly, EC environmental 
policy was to be extended into other policy areas through environmental impact assessments and 
increased consideration of environmental aspects in structural planning and regional planning. 
Parliament also wanted Art. 92 EEC to be changed in order to allow state subsidies for environmental 
purposes.




























































































The provision of funds for environmental purposes has been a goal of the House 
for several years. Resources for environment-related measures have always been 
contained under separate budget lines. In the annual budgetary procedure, 
Parliament had continuously gone beyond the respective appropriations proposed 
by the Commission. Again in the fall of 1990, the House’s rapporteur on the 1991 
budget complained that the Community’s financial commitment to environmental 
protection did not match its "grandiose declarations" and reiterated the call for a 
separate structural fund for the environment.73 The Commission has now proposed 
a Financial Instrument for the Environment (LIFE) which combines several existing 
budget lines with a view to increasing the visibility and effectiveness of the 
Community’s financial involvement in environmental policy and enhancing its 
integration with other actions.74 The relatively strong powers of the House in the 
Community’s budgetary process will allow it to underpin its own claims for a 
stronger environmental policy with concrete steps.
Besides its efforts to amend the Treaty basis with a view to increasing the 
environmental policy powers of the European Community, Parliament has pushed 
for an effective use of existing Community responsibilities. The implementation gap 
in EC environmental law has been mentioned above. Indeed, the correct 
transposition of EC environmental directives into national law and the actual 
application of these national laws and regulations have become a major cause of 
concern within the Community. In order to strengthen the EC’s monitoring and 
enforcement capacities, Parliament has proposed legal and institutional innovations.
Thus, the Commission is asked to establish more efficient proceedings for the 
control of the implementation of Community law. In its own judgement, Parliament 
has scored successes in pushing the Commission in this direction. According to a 
1988 resolution, the Commission set up a separate unit for the monitoring of the 
application of EC environmental law following a related claim by Parliament in 
1984.75 However, according to this resolution, the efforts to ensure the application
73 PE 143.404, 11.9.90.
74 COM(9l)28 final, 31.1.91.




























































































of EC law have to be stepped up. For this purpose, Parliament proposes an 
environment inspectorate "the task of which should be to monitor on the spot, by 
using mobile measuring stations, sampling and so forth, the actual application of 
Community law". The creation of European Inspectorates, "most notably and 
urgently in the field of the environment", is also contained in Parliament’s strategy 
for a European Union.76 Another device proposed in the 1984 resolution is an 
increased participation of Community citizens in the monitoring of Community law. 
Citizens should be encouraged to make complaints to the Commission regarding the 
failure of a member state to comply with Community regulation. In a second 
resolution on the same day, the European Parliament proposed an increase in 
Commission staff responsible for the implementation of environmental law, and the 
possible employment of environment inspectors in order to increase the Com­
mission’s monitoring capacities.77 Similarly, the Commission should become 
involved more directly in the implementation of EC environment law by promoting 
direct contacts with the respective authorities in the member states. Parliament’s 
urge to improve the enforcement of Community environmental law is one of the 
most significant elements of the assembly’s environment-related action. Its intention 
to become involved in this field itself is a peculiarity, as the monitoring of law 
enforcement is not a traditional task of a parliament. It testifies both to the 
magnitude of the problem and to the special nature of the Community political 
system.
A significant step in the building of the institutional framework for EC 
environmental policy was the establishment, in 1990, of the European Environment 
Agency.78 In the legislative process, Parliament proposed a wider scope of tasks 
for the Agency, especially competences in the monitoring of the enforcement of EC 
environmental law "on the ground", the preparation of transfrontier emergency 
plans, environmental impact assessments for Community-financed projects and
76 OJ No C 231, 17.9.90, p. 97.
77 OJ No C 94, 11.4.88, p. 155.



























































































"green labelling".79 While the Council was not willing to follow these proposals, it 
took over the House’s suggestion to reconsider the scope of the Agency’s tasks after 
two years. The powers of the Environment Agency were a question which was hotly 
debated within the assembly itself.
In sum, the European Parliament has pushed for an extension of Community 
powers in the field of environmental policy. It has done so by working for a 
strengthening of the enforcement capacities of the Community regarding the 
implementation of Community law, by demanding the incorporation of strong 
legislative powers for the Community into the Rome Treaties and by making 
proposals for the development of EC institutional structures. Parliament’s efforts 
in the environmental policy field are embedded into the House’s broader efforts to 
push the process of European Community integration.




























































































Part B - The making of environmental policy 
within the European Parliament
In the first part of this paper, the role of the European Parliament within the 
institutional system of the EC has been considered. It has been shown that 
Parliament indeed plays an active part concerning environmental policy but that its 
actual influence is limited due to the legal restrictions to which it is subjected. In 
the remainder, the focus of the analysis is on the internal workings of Parliament 
in this field. More specifically, the question addressed will be what is the 
importance of environmental policy within the assembly, and how do MEPs come 
to grips with the highly technical nature of much of environmental regulation. While 
it will not be possible to deal with these questions in great depth nor in an all- 
encompassing way, the discussion should shed some light on these issues and 
possibly point to fields for further research.
1. The importance of environmental policy within the European Parliament
Generally speaking, the protection of the environment is arguably of overriding 
importance for society as a whole and has to be taken into account in decisions in 
all policy sectors, as it concerns the very bases of human life. Nevertheless, conflicts 
of interests and perceptions between environmental policy orientations on the one 
hand, and claims motivated by other concerns do exist. Environmental policy­
makers have to struggle with actors representing different interests and points of 
view. Compromises have to be negotiated, and the content of these compromises 
reflects balances of power and the importance attributed to environmental 
considerations by the respective organisation or the social system as a whole.
At least as far declarations of intent are concerned, environmental considerations 
have gained in importance in the European Community over the last few years. 
Progress on a conceptual level is reflected in the four EC environmental action 




























































































one policy sector amongst others but has to be integrated into all other policy areas 
has over the years become a tenet of environmental policy. On a theoretical level 
at least, the European Parliament was very early in putting forward this principle 
in a resolution in 1972.80 The fourth EC environmental action programme of 1987 
contains the integration principle as one of its guidelines.81 The European 
Parliament has again supported this orientation in its resolution on the fourth action 
programme. Ecological considerations should "be given priority consideration for 
certain decisions in the field of research or industry."82 Even if we do not assume 
a "zero sum" situation, the integration principle to some extent implies a check on 
the realisation of non-environmental interests and can be expected to arouse 
resistance by actors in the other policy areas.
The European Parliament likes to give itself the reputation of a promoter of a 
sound and rigorous EC environmental policy, and has criticised the other 
Community organs for failing in pursuing such a policy.83 However, also 
Parliament itself has to accept scrutiny in a comparison of its general policy 
statements with its day-to-day activity. How well did the House do in integrating 
environmental concerns into its own policy-making in view of very divergent social 
interests and "traditional thinking"?
The regular parliamentary mechanism for ensuring a minimum of integration 
between different policy perspectives on some matter is the opinion given by one 
or two other "committees asked for an opinion" to the report and draft resolution 
prepared by the committee responsible.84 Thus, for instance, when the agriculture 
committee as the committee responsible deals with a problem which also touches 
on environmental policy objectives, the environment committee writes an opinion
80 OJ No C 46, 9.5.72, p. 10.
81 OJ No C 328, 7.12.87, pp. 9-13.
82 OJ No C 156, 15.6.87, p. 138.
83 For instance, the assembly - in its abovementioned resolution on the draft proposal for the 
fourth environmental action programme - expressed its belief "that the Commission’s programme does 
not make adequate provision for the ever-growing risks to man and the environment inherent in 
technical progress". (OJ No C 156, 15.6.1987, p. 138.)




























































































on the issue. In theory, this opinion shall be considered by the committee 
responsible when drafting its report and motion for a resolution. In practice, it is 
often only attached to the report as an annex for the consideration of the House. 
Obviously, the committee asked for an opinion can voice its point of view again in 
the plenary debate on the report. Proposals for amendments by the environment 
committee to reports of the agriculture committee reportedly stand a good chance 
of being adopted by the House.
An assessment of the importance attached to environmental policy orientations 
by the European Parliament can proceed in several different ways. Firstly, one 
could analyse how many and what kind of environment-related amendments to 
reports and resolutions and proposals were adopted in the plenary. This analysis has 
not been undertaken in the framework of this paper. Secondly, in a tentative way, 
the standing and the role of the environment committee within the European 
Parliament can be taken as an indicator. The environment committee can be seen 
as the advocate of a rigorous environmental policy which tries to interfere from its 
position into other policy areas. Thirdly, in a more thorough manner, one may look 
at the extent to which environmental orientations have been taken into account in 
Parliament’s policy-making in specific policy sectors. I will do this for the 
Community’s common agricultural policy (CAP).
1.1. The Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Consumer Protection o f 
the European Parliament
The organization of its assembly in eighteen different committees is one of the 
fundamental structural elements in the workings of the European Parliament. It is 
in the committees that the major part of the actual parliamentary work is done.85 
They draft the reports on legislative acts within the consultation and the 
cooperation procedures, and propose amendments and a draft resolution to the 
plenary. Under certain conditions, Parliament may even delegate to the appropriate





























































































committee the power to make a final decision in the consultation and the first 
reading of the cooperation procedure substituting a vote in the plenary. After 
Parliament has given its legislative opinion, the committee shall follow up its 
observation by the Commission and the Council. Motions for parliamentary 
resolutions submitted by individual MEPs are referred to the appropriate committee 
which decides on the further procedure. Subject to the authorization of Parliament’s 
enlarged Bureau, committees can draw up own-initiative reports and submit motions 
for resolutions to the plenary. Within the committee, individual MEPs acting as 
rapporteurs normally draft the reports which are then discussed and voted on by the 
committee.86 The importance of committees in the European Parliament reflects 
its character as a working parliament according to the German Bundestag model 
rather than a debating parliament according to the British model (Grabitz et al. 
1988: 402).
With its 51 members, the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and 
Consumer Protection is the third largest of Parliament’s committees. It is also one 
of its busiest. It has to cover a broad range of matters from the fairness of 
commercial transactions to cosmetic products to the disposal of waste. 
Environmental policy issues, however, account for a good part of the committee’s 
workload. The increasing importance of environmental policy over the last few years 
and the corresponding growth of responsibilities of the environment committee have 
even aroused misgivings within the Parliament which resulted in a delimitation of 
the committee’s responsibilities in July 1989. The environment committee lost its 
responsibility for work place safety to the social affairs committee.87 This cut-back 
on its policy scope is a reaction to the importance that the committee as a whole 
has gained mainly due to its environmental policy activities. Similarly, in 1989, 
several MEPs founded an informal "inter-group" for public health and consumer 
protection which can be seen as a competitor of the environment, public health and
86 There is a simplified procedure according to Rule 116 of the European Parliament’s Rules of 
Procedure (5th edition).





























































































consumer protection committee. For some time, an active "inter-group" on animal 
welfare has existed.
Concerning the standing and the role of the environment committee in the 
House, the first observation is that the environment committee has reportedly 
gained respect over recent years. Even if liberal and conservative MEPs complain 
of the committee of being too ideological, membership in it is now a well-thought-of 
position for MEPs. As the environment is a popular issue with the electorate, and 
as, on the other hand, a "reasonable" environmental policy is called for which does 
not impinge too much on economic and social life, the environment committee 
offers a good platform for politicians of many convictions. Indeed, in 1990, all 
political groups in the European Parliament were represented in the environment 
committee roughly according to their size, with the Greens and the Socialists being 
slightly overrepresented. For the Socialist group, the chairmanship of the 
environment committee is a number-one choice in the inter-party negotiations on 
the committee seat distribution at the beginning of the parliamentary term.
Apart from the reputation which the environment committee enjoys in the 
European Parliament which reflects the attention given to environmental matters 
by the assembly, a process can be conceived of in which committee members from 
different party groups develop an esprit de corps which leads them to be united 
around certain positions concerning the environment. According to this line of 
thought, the members of the environment committee would on average be "greener" 
than other MEPs. By representing solutions found in common in the environment 
committee in their respective party groups, environment committee members may 
shift the whole Parliament to a "greener" stance.
A first point in support of this hypothesis is that party lines indeed seem to loose 
importance in the environment committee. Reportedly, party-determined splits are 
not consistent within the committee and a lot of cross-party alliances occur. For 
instance, in the committee’s work on the European Environmental Agency, a split 
between supporters and opponents of a more or less principled stance in this issue 
developed in all party groups. Indeed, the Socialist group saw its two leading MEPs 




























































































frictions between the environment committee and other committees which transcend 
party lines are not exceptional.
More positively, an analysis of the environment committee’s voting behaviour on 
its reports shows a high degree of consensus. A lot of the votes on the committee’s 
recommendations to the plenary and motions for legislative resolutions are taken 
unanimously or with only two or three negative votes and abstentions. Tight votes 
within the committee are rare.88
The input that the environment committee may have into the work of other 
committees depends not least on the general relations with these committees. An 
important factor in this context can be MEPs sitting both on the environment 
committee and the other committee concerned. For example, in 1990, there was 
only one member of the environment committee sitting on the agriculture 
committee. Another 11 MEPs were a member of the environment committee and 
a substitute on the agriculture committee or vice versa.89 Not least, there is a lot 
of psychology involved. For instance, relations between Parliament’s environment 
and agriculture committees are reportedly affected by underlying tensions. One 
point of potential dispute is the delimitation of competences between the two 
committees. Both committees are responsible for certain aspects of veterinary 
legislation and for the regulation of the foodstuffs industry, and the line between 
those competences is often not easy to draw.90
In sum, the reputation and the role of the environment committee as an 
approximate indication of the extent to which environment-related concerns are 
taken into account suggest a "green" policy orientation of the European Parliament. 
The available evidence shows that the environment committee’s standing within the 
House is good and that its effectiveness in leading the House on environmental
88 This analysis is based on the voting behaviour on the 54 reports in the consultation procedure 
between 1984 and 1989 in which Parliament proposed amendments. The reports covered 
environmental, consumer protection and public health legislation.
89 List of Members, 19.11.1990.
90 See Amendment to the Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament, adopted on 26 July 
1989. While the agriculture committee is responsible for veterinary legislation relating to animal health, 




























































































policy issues may be increased by its relative internal unity which transcends normal 
party divisions.
1.2. The integration o f environmental aspects into agricultural policy
There are several policy areas lending themselves to an analysis of the integration 
of environmental considerations, and the choice among them is certainly subjective. 
Agricultural policy, which is taken as an example in this study, is interesting in that 
it is a core element of EC policy. It should also be said in advance, however, that 
it has certain aspects to it which make it a likely candidate for an analysis which 
shows a lack of integration of environmental policy concerns. For many years, the 
common agricultural policy has been a prime target of environmentalist critique. 
Art. 39 EEC which defines the goals of the CAP does not mention the 
consideration of environmental aspects. Moreover, farmers’ interests are well 
organised both in Community member states and at the Community level itself. 
This is also true for the European Parliament. Although equating farmers’ interests 
with an "anti-environment" stance is certainly misleading, the present mode of 
agriculture is open to a lot of criticism from an ecologist point of view, and 
resistance of agricultural interests to certain environmentalist claims can be 
foreseen. The policy integration problem can thus be expected to exist. As the 
analysis in this chapter will demonstrate, the European Parliament did not indeed 
play a leading role in pushing the EC to introduce environmental orientations into 
agricultural policy.
Before the 1980s, consideration for environmental ramifications of agricultural 
policy was basically absent from EC legislation. Rather, the ecological side benefits 
of farming were stressed. Thus, in an important agricultural Council directive of 
1975 on mountain and hill-farming and farming in certain less-favoured areas91, 
the "conservation of the countryside" was mentioned as a reason for financial 
support to farmers in certain less-favoured areas. In its legislative resolution on this




























































































directive in 1973, the European Parliament called on the Commission "to present 
proposals for measures capable of providing encouragement for forest farms, in 
view of their ecological importance". On the other hand, Parliament pointed to 
constraints imposed on farmers in nature conservancy areas for ecological reasons 
as a problem for farmers, and invited the Commission to consider this problem.92 
In sum, in the mid-1970s, agriculture was seen by the EC as contributing to 
environmental protection, and negative environmental consequences of agriculture 
were not perceived. Parliament shared this view.
Environmental concerns were for the first time taken into account explicitly 
under the CAP in a regulation on structural aids for the agriculture in the West of 
Ireland.93 This regulation stipulated that the farming support programme to be 
drawn up by the Irish government had to contain a statement on the compatibility 
of the measures envisaged with environmental protection. Thus, possible conflicts 
of interest between environmental protection and farming were perceived. In its 
opinion on the Commission proposal, the European Parliament did not specifically 
consider this question.94
The situation had again changed four years later. The Council regulation 
797/85/EEC viewed environmental protection as not ensuing automatically from 
farming and therefore provided for special investment aids for environmental 
protection and improvement measures.95 Beyond that, also member states were 
allowed to provide financial support for ecologically sound fanning in 
environmentally sensitive areas. In its legislative opinion on this regulation, 
Parliament did not particularly stress the ecological aspect beyond its treatment in 
the Commission proposal and the final regulation.96 It proposed an additional 
recital emphasizing the environmental aspects of farming, and a provision that 
would allow aids in the eggs and poultrymeat sector if they were linked to the
92 OJ No C 37, 4.6.73, p. 56.
93 Council Regulation 1820/80 (OJ No L 180,14.7.80, p. 1).
94 OJ No C 85, 8.4.80, p. 57.
95 OJ No L 93, 30.3.85, p. 1.




























































































improvement of the environment and animal welfare. This latter provision was 
more in favour of the eggs and poultrymeat sector than of environmental protection, 
though, as the Commission had proposed that no such aids should be allowed at all. 
In any case, neither proposal was adopted by the Council.
The three pieces of legislation which have been referred to so far do not present 
the European Parliament as exercising a leading role in the integration of 
environmental orientations in EC agricultural policy. While the legislative process 
leading up to these regulations has not been reviewed, at least the final legislative 
opinions of the House did not make any substantial proposals for an extended 
consideration of environmental concerns. Up to 1985, environment-related 
provisions in EC agricultural policy obviously originated in the Commission or the 
Council, but not in the European Parliament.
In 1985, an important step was made by Parliament’s environment committee 
with a hearing on "Environment and Agriculture" (see European Parliament 1985b). 
Around this hearing, frictions arose between the environment committee and 
Parliament’s Committee on Agriculture, Fisheries and Food. While the agriculture 
committee complained after the hearing that it had not been integrated in its 
preparation97, members of the environment committee said that the agriculture 
committee did not respond to the environment committee’s invitation. In the 
hearing, the participating members and substitute members of the environment 
committee outnumbered their colleagues from the agriculture committee. 
Reportedly, this hearing was the first occasion at which the agriculture committee 
considered environmental matters.
Reading between the lines, the differences in approach between the two 
committees became already apparent in the introductory statements to the hearing 
by Beate Weber, the chairwoman of the environment committee and Jean Mouchel, 
vice chairman of the agriculture committee. While Mrs Weber acknowledged the 
difficult situation of farmers in the Community, she asked two questions which must
97 /See the agriculture committee’s opinion on the report resulting from the hearing (Doc A2-




























































































sound provocative from a traditional fanners’ point of view: "Has stepping up 
production resulted in a better situation all round, or in better product quality? Is 
European agricultural policy socially and environmentally acceptable?” Mr Mouchel, 
on the other hand, pointed to the achievements of the CAP and stated: "It is 
therefore important now to consider other proposed reforms that relate principally 
to social aspects and environment-protection from the standpoint of ecology, with 
a view to giving them more prominence in future, though of course without 
adopting any measure that might impede the ordinary course of agricultural 
activity." These remarks reflected repeated tensions between agricultural policy­
makers and environmental policy-makers in the European Parliament.
The hearing resulted in a substantial report of the environment committee by 
François Rodants du Vivier.98 Without wholesalely condemning the farmers in the 
Community, this report discussed in great detail the different aspects of 
environmental problems linked to EC agricultural and forestry policy. The 
agriculture committee delivered a long opinion on this report which recognized the 
negative environmental ramifications of the CAP and the lack of integration of 
environmental concerns, and welcomed a new emphasis by the Commission on 
environmental considerations in agricultural policy. Yet, the opinion warned that 
environment-related measures which would restrict farmers’ incomes would be 
counterproductive: "the best way to protect the environment is to ensure reasonable 
prosperity for farmers."99 Therefore, a broader perspective comprising not only the 
environment but also rural development and the social conditions of agriculture was 
advocated. Supportive measures (income aids for environmental purposes, 
information and training, research) were favoured against restrictive measures.100 
On the whole, the opinion, while advocating new steps to make agricultural policy 
more ecologically sound, defended the interest of farmers in the maintenance of 
their position. Nevertheless, this opinion marked an important step by the 
agriculture committee towards at least recognizing environmental objectives.
98 Doc A2-207/85, 3.2.86.
99 Doc A2-207/85, 3.2.86, p. 64.




























































































In the vote on the draft resolution attached to Roelants du Vivier’s report, the 
European Parliament, after a long procedure with many amendments and separate 
votes, basically merged the draft resolution by the environment committee and the 
conclusions of the opinion of the agriculture committee. Two central claims of the 
environment committee’s motion did not find their way into the final resolution, 
however. They referred to the idea of a tax on nitrogenous fertilizers and "limits on 
the application of fertilizers according to natural soil characterists and crop type". 
The resolution, which was passed with 300 votes in favour and 13 abstentions, called 
for "a revision of the common agricultural policy in terms of a more integrated 
approach to ecological and regional concerns and differences and an overall policy 
based on quantitative and qualitative objectives." It contained a long list of actions 
to be taken.101
The 1985 hearing on agriculture and the environment was a major breakthrough 
in Parliament’s consideration of this interface between two important policy fields. 
Moreover, since then, the sensitivity of the agriculture committee for environmental 
concerns seems to have increased, although general interest for ecological questions 
is still low. It is still only individual MEPs who focus on ecological aspects of 
agricultural policy. Own-initiative reports for the agriculture committee were 
prepared by the Green MEP Friedrich Wilhelm Graefe zu Baringdorf on the effects 
of the use of biotechnology on the farming industry102, and by the Socialist MEP 
José Happart on the use of hormones in the dairy and meat sectors.103
An attempt to closely link structural agricultural policy measures with 
environmental policy objectives has recently been made by the German liberal MEP 
Manfred Vohrer, who is a member both of Parliament’s agriculture and 
environment committees.104 An important element in present EC agricultural 
policy is the set-aside of arable land in order to limit surplus production. Farmers 
who decide to set aside part of their land can be reimbursed by the member states.
101 OJ No C 68, 24.3.86, pp. 72, 80.
102 Doc A2T59/86, 21.11.86.
103 Doc A2-30/88, 25.3.88.




























































































As the set-aside scheme has so far not produced satisfactory results, the 
Commission had proposed to make the incentives for farmers more attractive. On 
the basis of the report by MEP Vohrer, Parliament in 1990 amended the 
Commission proposal to allow member states to increase set-aside premiums 
according to the length of time the land has been out of production, the reversibility 
of the set-aside and its ecological usefulness.105 This provision was to encourage 
the set-aside of land for ecological purposes by making it more attractive to farmers 
and thus to contribute to environmental protection. While Parliament’s proposals 
were not adopted by the Council for the regulation under discussion106, they found 
their way into a new Commission draft for a regulation on environmentally friendly 
agricultural production methods.107
Agriculture is a policy field which is characterised by strongly entrenched 
interests of the majority of farmers and agro-industry who are to a large extent 
opposed to or at least sceptical of environmental considerations which interfere with 
agricultural practice. These interests are well represented in the European 
Parliament, and specifically in its agriculture committee. Indeed, it needed the 1985 
hearing on "Environment and Agriculture" organised by the environment committee 
to make Parliament sensitive to the environmental ramifications of EC agricultural 
policy. The environment committee acted as a catalyst within the House and 
successfully promoted its assignment. Already prior to 1985, however, environmental 
considerations had made their first, however small, inroad into EC agricultural 
policy on the initiative of the Commission and individual member states. Even since 
then, a leading role of Parliament in integrating environment and agriculture is 
difficult to see. In a 1990 resolution, the House limited itself to calling on the 
Commission to make further suggestions on the integration of environmental and 
agricultural policy.108
105 OJ No C 96, 17.4.90, pp. 156, 278.
106 See Council Regulation No 752/90 (OJ No L 83, 30.3.90, p. l).
107 COM(90)366 final, 2.10.90; The idea of a land set-aside for environmental reasons was 
contained, however, already in the Commission’s communication on "Environment and agriculture" in 
1988 (COM(88)338 final, 8.6.88).




























































































2. The problem of expertise in environmental policy-making 
in the European Parliament
The problem of expertise is one of the most intriguing questions concerning 
environmental policy-making, and, indeed, the making of environmental policy 
cannot be adequately understood without taking into account the role of knowledge 
and its holders in the decision-making process. By way of a short introduction, this 
chapter first outlines the problem as it presents itself for the Members of the 
European Parliament. Its main part is devoted to describing how scientific input 
into parliamentary work is organised. At the same time it is pointed out that 
Parliament is not adequately equipped to acquire the expertise it needs.
In many cases, decision-makers in environmental policy are confronted with 
highly technical questions and are affected by scientific uncertainty about the 
ramifications of the matters to be decided upon. For example, the setting of 
ambient quality standards should ideally be based on an exact appraisal of the 
effects of certain concentrations of some dangerous substance in water, air or soil 
on the flora and fauna and human health. This appraisal, however, is extremely 
difficult to make or may not even be possible from a scientific point of view. In 
comparison to ambient quality standards, the decision on the inclusion of a bird 
species into the list of protected animals prima facie seems unproblematic. 
However, for the legitimation of such a decision, data must be furnished which show 
that the species concerned is threatened with extinction. Thirdly, even the scientific 
community is able to make predictions about the rise in temperatures over the next 
decades due to the greenhouse effect only within certain margins of uncertainty. 
Some scientists even challenge the very existence of this global environmental 
hazard. Yet, if the potentially disastrous consequences of a possible greenhouse 
effect are to be mitigated, measures have to be taken now. Even when it comes to 
the assessment of certain legal and economic instruments for environmental policy 
purposes, many policy-makers for good reasons seek expert advice.
Roughly speaking, three different roots of the problem of expertise confronting 




























































































be unable to provide sure answers about causal relationships, the significance of 
thresholds (e.g. concerning emissions or ambient concentrations of certain 
substances) or future trends. For many issues, a lack of data, of scientific knowledge 
or even of scientific attention does not allow a well-founded assessment. Secondly, 
monopolies or quasi-monopolies of technical expertise may exist. Only producers 
of a specific good may know about the technical feasibility and the costs of changes 
in product design or in the production process required by some environmental 
regulation. They may not be willing to disclose such information to policy-makers. 
Lastly, the lack of an adequate professional and knowledge background of policy­
makers themselves may hinder them in making informed judgements. Policy-makers 
cannot be experts in all fields in which their decision is required.
The Members of the European Parliament who are involved in environmental 
policy are particularly confronted with these problems as EC environmental law is 
for a large part characterized by its rather technical content. As Community 
environmental law is implemented by the EC member states, very detailed 
specifications are required in order to avoid differences in the implementation of 
EC regulation between countries which might lead to differences in regulatory costs 
imposed on industry. This in turn would result in distortions in competition. For the 
same reasons, regulation through flexible mechanisms of interaction between the 
regulatory authorities and the regulatees, as opposed to clear legal provisions, is not 
possible in Community environmental regulation. Therefore, while the choice of 
instruments by which certain environmental objectives are to be achieved is left to 
the member states, Community environmental law by necessity has to be precise as 
far as the objectives to be attained are concerned. From all this follows the 
necessarily technical nature of many legislative matters which MEPs have to deal 
with in the environmental policy field.
Moreover, in contrast to civil servants who may be specialized in one or a few 
areas and to some extent become experts themselves, parliamentarians generally 
have to cover a large spectrum of political questions even if they specialize to some 
extent. Besides, they are involved in many tasks linked to their "political business", 




























































































to admit that a problem of knowledge seriously affects their work and many would 
emphasize the political character of their decisions, few MEPs if any at all would 
disagree that they are overburdened with work and cannot properly process all the 
information received.
The European Parliament as all parliaments in Western democracies has given 
itself various means which should help it in coming to terms with the problem of 
expertise described above. Basically, these means consist in employing staff for 
research purposes in Parliament’s secretariat on the one hand, and in drawing on 
outside experts in various ways on the other.
Day-to-day support for MEPs’ work is provided by the secretariat of the 
European Parliament in Luxemburg.109 There are two directorate generals in the 
secretariat which serve the parliamentarians’ needs while being themselves in 
difficulties when it comes to highly specialized problems. In particular, a lack of 
staff with a natural science or engineering background is an important impediment 
to the secretariat’s work.
In the first department of relevance here, the Directorate General of Committees 
and Delegations, Parliament’s different committees each have their own secretariat. 
These committee secretariats are responsible for the administration of the 
committee, for the preparation of the committee’s sessions and for supporting the 
work of committee members. For these purposes, the environment committee’s 
secretariat has a staff of seven A-level officials.
The committee secretariat’s scientific input becomes relevant when rapporteurs 
appointed by the committee are preparing their reports. One of the secretariat’s 
officials is assigned to assist the rapporteur. The extent of the official’s involvement 
in the writing of the report varies from case to case depending on the interest which 
the rapporteur himself takes in the matter and the amount of work he or she is 
willing to invest. Indeed, there is no control over who is actually writing a report. 
The rapporteur merely has to take the responsibility for the report, to deliver it and
109 It should be noted that this description focuses on the scientific resources provided for by the 
European Parliament itself. Other potential sources of knowledge are MEPs’ personal assistants and 




























































































to guide it through parliamentary proceedings. Indeed, it is rather exceptional that 
a rapporteur drafts his report all by himself. In some cases, his personal assistant 
does the main part of the work, and reportedly MEPs increasingly employ qualified 
personal assistants to help them in their substantive work. In other cases, the 
secretariat official assigned to the rapporteur takes over most of the information 
gathering. While no data on the involvement of secretariat officials in the 
preparation of reports exist, secretariat officials are said to write most of them at 
least as far as the field of environmental policy is concerned.
Besides the environment committee’s secretariat, the Directorate General for 
Research within Parliament’s secretariat in Luxemburg is involved in helping MEPs 
in their work. Within the Directorate General, at present one A-level civil servant 
is responsible for environment-related issues. While not being charged with purely 
administrative tasks, the Directorate General for Research answers questions 
addressed to them by MEPs, does ghost-writing for MEPs and undertakes studies 
commissioned by MEPs for internal purposes or to be published in the framework 
of Parliament’s information and public relations efforts. As is true for the 
environment committee’s secretariat, also the work of the Directorate General for 
Research is mainly ad hoc in its nature and tailored towards the immediate needs 
of parliamentarians.
The division of labour between the environment committee’s secretariat and the 
Directorate General for Research is not always clear-cut. As a general rule, 
personal and national affiliations between individual Members of the European 
Parliament and civil servants in Parliament’s secretariat play an important role. In 
addition, the personal expertise of individual officials obviously is important. 
Individual MEPs and officials may have established a fruitful working relationship. 
Besides, the basically arbitrary factor of a common language between an MEP and 
a civil servant in Parliament’s secretariat exercises a selective power which is 
probably often underestimated. In terms of its assignments, however, the 
Directorate General for Research is responsible less for the day-to-day work of the 




























































































What support can Parliament’s secretariat in Luxemburg, as it has been described 
so far, provide for Members of Parliament in terms of scientific expertise? The 
crucial impediment to adequate scientific and technological advice on the part of 
Parliament’s secretariat is the lack of staff with a natural science or engineering 
background. Nearly all of the secretariat’s A-level staff is composed of lawyers, 
economists and social scientists. While these disciplines have their own 
qualifications which are of crucial importance to the work of the European 
Parliament, the professional composition of Parliament’s staff in terms of academic 
training is little adapted to the need for policy advice in complex scientific matters. 
Obviously, the possibility of learning and specialization beyond an originally 
acquired academic training exists. Moreover, the secretariat of a parliament by its 
very nature cannot be a research institution covering all disciplines and sub­
disciplines of natural and engineering sciences. It is nevertheless true that 
Parliament’s in-house resources to provide the scientific expertise which is required 
in many environmental policy matters is thus unnecessarily restricted.
For each organization, the alternative to in-house expertise is to seek advice from 
outside. This is indeed what parliamentarians themselves do, and what is also done 
by the officials of Parliament’s secretariat. Private and official outside contacts to 
research institutions, individual scientists and other experts can serve to gather 
information and valuation about issues in question. An important potential source 
of information for environmental policy-makers in the European Parliament is the 
Commission’s directorate general responsible for the environment which to some 
extent seems to be willing to share its information with the environment committee 
and its secretariat. Another potential source of expertise are different interest 
groups. Both business and environmentalist groups lobby Parliament to make their 
voice heard, although the environmentalist lobby at the EC level is hopelessly weak. 
Informations provided by lobbyists can be of great use to policy-makers. In view of 
the substantive input which secretariat officials can have into Parliament’s work, the 
attention of many interest groups is directed not only at the level of MEPs but also 




























































































A general problem with outside expertise is that the right questions have to be 
asked and the information received has to be evaluated. Policy-makers have to 
assess the accuracy of some piece of information, and its significance in the light of 
their own decision-making parameters. Is the expertise reliable? What implications 
does it have for some decision to be made? What counter-evidence or counter­
arguments have to be considered? The application of outside expertise to concrete 
policy problems has to be made by Parliament and its staff itself. To some extent, 
it again requires in-house expertise which the European Parliament is lacking as far 
as the natural and engineering sciences are concerned.
There are two mechanisms by which the European Parliament tries to enlarge 
its expertise by drawing on outside sources. Based on an initiative of Parliament’s 
Committee on Energy, Research and Technology in 1985, Parliament’s Scientific 
and Technological Options Assessment Programme (STOA) was launched in 1987. 
Directed by the STOA Panel composed of eight MEPs representing different 
parliamentary committees (among them one representative of Parliament’s 
environment committee), STOA is now based in Parliament’s Directorate General 
for Research and has a staff of one full-time official and various STOA Fellows 
with limited fixed-term contracts. The assignment of STOA is to provide scientific 
and technical expertise to Parliament with a view to the assessment of different 
policy options. The expertise is provided either by the STOA Fellows who in 
general have a natural science or engineering background, or through the 
contracting out of research projects to other institutions. The contracting-out of 
projects to other institutions is the cornerstone of STOA’s activities.
The potential of STOA consists in the temporary creation of in-house expertise 
through the employment of STOA Fellows who either conduct their own studies or 
supervise outside research. This mechanism is appropriate particularly when it 
comes to questions relating to major policy decisions and to the development of 
long-term perspectives. On the other hand, STOA can be only a start for the build­




























































































of staff and budget are much too limited to provide expertise on a continuous 
basis.110 Moreover, the position of STOA within the European Parliament has so 
far been problematic. Its work has not been publicised enough and MEPs have 
shown little interest in its work. While STOA has been working on environment- 
related issues like trans-frontier pollution problems and hazardous waste 
management, the integration of its work with the environment committee and other 
Parliament bodies has been wanting. A striking example for this lack of integration 
bodies was work on the environmental situation in Czechoslovakia which was 
undertaken both by STOA and the Directorate General for Research without 
coordination.
A second mechanism for seeking outside advice are public hearings organised by 
the environment committee. These hearings unite Members of Parliament and 
outside experts to discuss individual policy problems. They serve to directly confront 
with each other different points of view on the problem under discussion with a 
view to facilitating MEPs’ formulation of their own position. At the same time, 
hearings are a means of drawing public attention to the European Parliament. The 
environment committee has held hearings on acid rain in 1983111, agriculture and 
the environment in 1985 (see above), the implementation of international 
conventions on the protection of wild fauna and flora in 1986 and the use of 
economic incentives in environmental policy in 1990. Also in 1990, Parliament’s 
Committee for Energy, Research and Technology held a hearing on energy and the 
environment.
Both STOA and the organisation of parliamentary hearings are means by which 
the European Parliament tries to increase its competence on individual policy 
matters through the establishment of in-house expertise and the services of outside 
experts. Compared to the needs of Parliament for expertise particularly in the area 
of environmental policy, however, these means are underdeveloped. In particular, 
continuous scientific advice is not provided as both hearings and STOA activities
110 In 1990, STOA’s budget was 500 000 ECU. STOA has recently also been offered a substantial 
one-time grant by a major Japanese company. Although formally this grant was not linked to any 
conditions, this proposal has aroused discussions on the scientific independence of STOA.



























































































focus on individual projects and are thus not suited for Parliament’s on-going work. 
The lack of staff with a natural science or engineering training hinders Parliament’s 
secretariat in its policy-advice function towards MEPs when it comes to the 
scientific and technological matters by which much of EC environmental policy is 
characterised.
Finally, while this discussion has focused on scientific and technical expertise, the 
importance also of economic and regulatory expertise must be pointed out. 
Although the needs in this area may be less evident, the capacity to perform cost- 
benefit analyses as a basis for regulatory decisions and to evaluate the potential of 
different regulatory instruments is an important precondition for informed choices 






























































































This paper aimed to give a survey of the role of the European Parliament in EC 
environmental policy. Similarly, I have looked into Parliament’s internal workings 
in this field.
Concerning its position in the political process of the European Community, 
different functions of the House have been outlined. First, the function of MEPs in 
articulating the environment-related concerns of European citizens has been pointed 
to. This articulation function is a central part of parliamentary activities in all 
democratic systems. Particular importance accrues to Parliament’s control over the 
EC Commission and the Council of Ministers, and to MEPs’ active involvement in 
the monitoring of the implementation of EC environmental law. Efforts in this 
latter area are at the same time appropriate because of the problems that exist, and 
difficult due to the limited powers and capacities of the European Parliament. In 
both its articulation and its monitoring functions, the House works mainly through 
its questions put to the Commission and the Council and its own-initiative reports 
and resolutions. In addition, the Commission reports to Parliament on the 
implementation of Community law.
The function of Parliament as a legislator is still limited because of the legal 
constraints imposed on Parliament’s participation in the legislative process by the 
EC Treaties. The last word in EC legislation still lies with the Council, restricting 
the EC Commission to an initiation and mediation role and the European 
Parliament to an advisory function. While the Single European Act of 1987 with the 
introduction of the cooperation procedure has increased Parliament’s leverage also 
in many environmental matters, the three case studies have illustrated that the 
House’s overall influence in EC legislation is still piecemeal. Even under the 
cooperation procedure, it depends on favourable external circumstances beyond the 
control of MEPs. At best, the European Parliament becomes a co-player in the 




























































































Commission and its proposals are now less likely to be disregarded than even a few 
years ago (cf also Schmuck 1990: 71).
The last function which has been focused on is Parliament’s role in pushing for 
increased Community responsibilities and powers in the field of environmental 
policy. The incorporation of a legal basis for a strong Community environmental 
policy into the Treaties has been a major concern for the House. Its efforts were 
also directed at the strengthening both of the Commission’s law enforcement 
capacities and of its own monitoring powers.
Concerning the making of environmental policy by the House itself, two aspects 
have been dealt with. Firstly, the integration of environmental orientations into 
other policy areas by Parliament has been focused on. The environment committee 
as an advocate of environmental concerns within the House is well-regarded and 
appears to be in a good position to lead the way in environmental policy matters. 
A case study on the consideration of ecological aspects in EC agricultural policy, 
however, revealed that the integration of the environmental and the agricultural 
policy areas by the House was wanting. Indeed, the agriculture committee needed 
some starting help from the environment committee to become at all sensitive to 
ecological concerns. Overall, the European Parliament rather trailed behind the 
Commission and the Council in making EC agricultural policy "greener".
Secondly, the problem of scientific expertise in Parliament’s environmental 
policy-making has been highlighted. Various mechanisms and instruments have been 
described which MEPs use to try to inform their judgements in scientific and 
technical matters. These are the provision of in-house expertise by Parliament’s 
secretariat, and the drawing on outside experts through personal contacts, the 
STOA unit in Parliament’s secretariat and the organization of hearings. After this 
description the impression remains that Parliament is not sufficiently equipped to 
adequately deal with the highly complex policy matters it often has to decide on.
A comprehensive assessment of Parliament’s record in environmental policy has 
not been possible in the framework of this paper due to the broad range of 
activities and legislation that would have to be covered. In particular, in regard to 




























































































is hard to measure. Only many in-depth case studies could yield enough evidence 
to corroborate an informed answer. Such thorough analyses would probably also 
reveal more cases in which Parliament failed to live up to its proclaimed role as a 
motor of Community environmental policy by its own fault. The failure on its 
initiative regarding access to information legislation in 1987, due to a lack of 
internal coordination and bad plenary attendance, and the failure of Parliament to 
push for the integration of environmental concerns into EC agricultural policy are 
two cases in point.
The evidence which has been gathered confirms neither the claim that 
Parliament is the motor of environmental policy in the European Community nor 
the verdict that it is a mere talking-shop. Besides Parliament, it is the Commission 
and some "green" member states who act as catalysts for environmental policy by 
setting the agenda and pushing for the tightening-up of regulation. Parliament, on 
the other hand, has indeed made substantial efforts to improve EC environmental 
policy, and has to some extent been successful in it. There is no question that its 
restricted legal powers have been the major barrier to more influence of the House 
in this area. A still valid summary assessment is the one made by the Institute for 
European Environmental Policy in its balance sheet of Parliament’s work in its first 
term following direct elections:
Within the limits of the means at its disposal, in relation to environmental policy, 
the European Parliament thus on balance played a role which was not negligible. 
Nevertheless, the difficulties which it encountered were considerable, linked not 
to the specific nature of this policy area but to the legal foundation on which its 
activity is currently based. (Institute for European Environmental Policy, 1984: 2)
In any case, it seems rather doubtful that, on the whole, EC policy in general, and
EC environmental policy in particular would merit the "green label" for ecological
soundness.
If the limited legal powers of the European Parliament are the main barrier to 
its influence on EC environmental policy, and if Parliament has been, if not the, but 
at least a motor of policy-making in this area, then enlarged powers of Parliament 
in the institutional balance of the EC should be supported by environmentalists. 




























































































increased rights of participation in the legislative process, and which applies also to 
a substantial part of environmental policy matters, was a first step in the right 
direction. The extension of majority voting in the Council and a new "procedure of 
co-decision between Parliament and Council" for EC legislation in all policy areas 
including environmental policy is a major objective of Parliament in the present 
intergovernmental conference on political union. Furthermore, certain rights of 
initiative are claimed in order to complement the role of the Commission as the 
initiator of legislation.112 Unfortunately, the willingness among member states’ 
governments to grant Parliament more rights is rather small. Moreover, the 
Commission has already warned against an extension of parliamentary rights at the 
expense of Commission powers. Thus, the prospects for a strengthened role of the 
European Parliament in EC politics look bleak. The democratic deficit is going to 
persist. Even under the present restrictive conditions, however, Parliament has been 
able to gain, in a piecemeal fashion, certain rights which are not provided for by the 
Treaties setting up the European Community.113
The belief that an enlargement of Parliament’s powers would be good news from 
an environmental perspective obviously is based on the assumption that the House, 
acting under widened responsibilities, would continue to push for a stronger 
environmental policy. This assumption is open to debate. Firstly, if more powers 
were vested in the House shortcomings in Parliament’s work would have graver 
practical consequences. Environmentalists would therefore want to see Parliament’s 
capabilities improved. In addition, it may be suspected that with increasing 
competences the House would be subject to more pressures by diverse interest 
groups. Indeed, since the strengthening of Parliament’s role by the Single Act, 
lobbying with MEPs has grown. Correspondingly, national and party cleavages 
within the assembly may deepen. Tensions within the House between different 
policy objectives may become stronger as the House would have to ensure overall 
coherence of its policy-making to a larger extent than today. In the process, it may
112 See Parliament’s resolution of 11.7.1990 (OJ No C 231, 17.9.90, p. 97).
113 Remember the reporting of the Commission to the House on the implementation of EC law 




























































































cut back on its environmental policy objectives. The analysis of the integration of 
environmental concerns into the common agricultural policy in this paper illustrates 
such tensions and the problem of entrenched interests. The general political context 
within which the European Parliament has to operate would impose itself to a 
larger extent. Certainly, no parliamentary assembly can be expected to lead the way 
far ahead of the general balance between different political and social interests.
As each assembly is its members, the human factor must not be underrated. 
Individual MEPs’ active interest in some field, if sustained, may suffice to influence 
Community policy-making. This is particularly true if it goes together with more 
widespread public attention on the matter. Indeed, it is a small group of MEPs who 
by their efforts in putting questions to the Commission and the Council and in 
writing carefully investigated reports to a large extent define Parliament’s profile 
in this policy area. While due to double mandates in the European Parliament and 
national political offices some Members hardly ever appear in Strasburg or Brussels, 
these activists devote a lot of energy to their parliamentary tasks.
This paper has highlighted two weak points in Parliament’s treatment of 
environmental policy, and the question imposes itself how these weaknesses can be 
tackled.
While parliamentarians may be or become experts in their own right, a limiting 
factor of the European Parliament’s work in environmental policy is the lack of 
scientific, engineering and economic and regulatory expertise on which MEPs can 
draw within their own secretariat. This is particularly true in view of the highly 
technical nature of much of EC environmental legislation. It is striking that a 
parliament that has to deal with so many technical matters has hardly any staff with 
a scientific or engineering background. Obviously, it is not Parliament’s task to 
devise legislation in its detail. Also, Parliament will always have to rely on outside 
expertise through more or less formal channels. However, it is hard to imagine how 
the House can adequately assess information given to it by the Commission as well 
as technical regulations contained in legislative proposals without in-house expertise.
While larger research projects can be contracted out through Parliament’s 




























































































Technological Options Assessment Programme (STOA), in-house expertise is 
particularly needed for Parliament’s routine day-to-day work. This need requires the 
enlargement of Parliament’s secretariat by the employment of staff with a scientific, 
engineering and economic training. Equipped with such new staff, MEPs would be 
in a better position to evaluate Commission proposals and Council decisions in 
terms of their costs, benefits and technical feasibility, and to ground their opinions 
on scientifically valid arguments. Also the evaluation of outside expertise, on which 
MEPs will have to continue to rely for some part, would be improved. In sum, 
arguably both Parliament’s legislative and its controlling functions would be 
strengthened by better in-house expertise.
The case study on agricultural policy betrayed that a lack of integration of 
environmental policy concerns into this policy area exists in the work of the House. 
The same is probably true also in other policy fields. One idea to solve the problem 
would be the establishment of an internal monitoring mechanism which would 
involve the environment committee in the control of the work of other committees. 
The environment committee would have the right to interfere in the decisions of 
other committees. This solution, however, is not practicable for at least two reasons. 
Firstly, the tensions which such control would create within the House might be 
more damaging than useful for the conduct of environmental policy. Secondly, the 
environment committee’s resources are far too limited to allow such a monitoring 
role. Even now, the environment committee could propose many more amendments 
to reports and draft resolutions of other committees than it can actually handle.
It seems that the solution to the policy integration problem can only be found in 
an increased sensitivity and awareness of the assembly as a whole to environmental 
concerns. This awareness may be fostered by the environment committee holding 
hearings on environmental aspects in certain other policy areas. The 1985 hearing 
on agriculture and the environment is a good example in this regard. The recent 
hearing of the energy, research and technology committee on energy and the 
environment shows that other committees may become active in this field as well. 
Well-founded opinions of the environment committee on reports by other 




























































































contribute to the successful integration of environmental orientations into other 
policy fields. The good reputation of the environment committee within Parliament 
both reflects the general importance attached to environmental matters by the 
House and helps in making the assembly’s positions on individual issues "greener”.
Looking at the institutional structure of the European Community and its reform 
with a view to the creation of a political union, it must not be forgotten that 
progress in European Community environmental policy is driven for the most part 
by individual member states. Some countries may also be willing to lead the way by 
tightening up regulation on a national basis. Therefore, the wholesale 
"europeanization" of environmental policy, as partly advocated by the European 
Parliament, is certainly not desirable from an environmental point of view. Rather, 
the perspective lies in combining the principle of subsidiarity with an extension of 
majority voting to all environmental policy matters and the possibility for member 
states to go beyond EC environmental standards. It is within this context that the 
European Parliament’s role in environmental policy-making should be strengthened 
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